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Imperiled America

IMPERILED AMERICA

A discussion of the complications
forced upon the United States by
the World War

By

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To my guide, my counselor, my friend

MY WIFE

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PREFACE

At a time when high government officials and eminent statesmen are demanding that the country be prepared against war, it is important for the people to be informed of the causes moving them. In the following pages I have tried as an American proud of his birthright and jealous of the honor and integrity of his country, to set forth our perilous situation in a world at war. I have refrained purposely from excessive detail, and present the facts in a fashion which I hope will bring home to those who read what I have written our actual points of international contact and international conflict.

It is true to-day as in past ages that "in union there is strength." Above all things, the American people must be united. They must learn the facts underlying our foreign relations and apply to them their common

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sense, in order to develop policies which will make for right and justice and assure their prosperity in the prosperity of humanity.

JOHN CALLAN O'LAUGHLIN

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IMPERILED AMERICA

CHAPTER I

POINTS OF CONTACT

The great war which brought Armageddon to Europe in August, 1914, confronted the American people with facts of which they were ignorant or at the most dimly cognizant. It made them realize that their "splendid isolation" had vanished; that their "detached and distant situation," to which Washington referred as an important element of their security, no longer existed. The sea, once a barrier, had become an avenue. Progress in science and invention had overcome space and lessened time. The separate interests of nations had become the inter-related interests of mankind. What

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happened in Servia became of vital moment to the rest of the world, just as what happened in the United States provoked the unremitting attention and the direct concern of foreign countries.

The American people know now, as they never knew before, that they belong to a great system of humanity, every part of which is affected by the prosperity or distress of every other part. The war, beginning in Europe, spread to every continent and every ocean, dislocating political affiliations, shaking economics and rocking finance. It inaugurated a reign of lawlessness on land and sea, wherein might rode roughshod over humanity and right. The actual or fancied necessities of belligerents were offered as an excuse for measures, without justice and frequently without reason, directed not only against each other but against nations which were not parties to their conflict. Thus, the maritime rights of the United States, in respect of persons and property, have been violated. This

country has suffered interruption of its commerce and disturbance of its industry. Its internal security and neutrality have been threatened by plots hatched by foreign nations. It has felt, and, throughout the war—indeed, throughout its life—will continue to feel the pressure of outside forces. In spite of the earnest wish of the American people to be let alone, in spite of their fervent desire to remain at peace, they have come to realize that there are points of conflict which menace them with war.

Let us see where these danger points are: Do they lie within as well as without ourselves? Are we aggressive without being military? Do we lack the patriotism that inspires self-sacrifice? Are the conglomerate elements of which we are made, separate in their allegiance and disloyal to the point of revolution, as the German government believes? Is the strength we claim, in reality weakness? Does bluster take the place of courage, bluff, the place of decision? Are

we become another China as a result of our pursuit of wealth during the period following the Civil War? Will we suffer any humiliation rather than the pain which just action may cause?

And then, turning to our international situation: Are we determined to protect the commerce, valued at more than five billion dollars a year, which our industry and activity have produced? Do we realize that the Monroe Doctrine is as necessary to our peace and safety now as it was when, militarily weak, we enunciated it? Have we built the Panama Canal at an expenditure of more than \$400,000,000, for the benefit of another power of sufficient strength and vigor to take it? Why did we proclaim the principles of the integrity of China and the Open Door in that empire? Was it for the purpose of assuring equal opportunity for our commerce, or was it a foolish expression of American buncombe, without rhyme or reason, intended merely to minister to our pride as a world power

and for political effect at home? We sought to "neutralize" the Trans-Manchurian railroad. What was the object and what the result of this intervention in the vast northern province of China?

We have acquired a chain of islands across the Pacific Ocean. For what purpose? We took the Philippines and are now paving the way for their independence. Yet we have no thought of withdrawing from Guam in the near-by Ladrone Islands! We got out of the tripartite alliance with Germany and Great Britain respecting the Samoan Islands, and retained possession of Tutuila in that group. At intervals, we have endeavored to purchase the Galapagos Islands belonging to and lying off the coast of Ecuador, which command the Pacific entrance to the Panama Canal. We are seeking to make, and we proudly call, the Caribbean Sea an American lake. Why all these measures?

We hold Porto Rico and Culebra; we

have a protectorate over Cuba and a naval station at Guantanamo, on the southeastern shore of that island; we are maintaining a financial protectorate over Santo Domingo; we are applying the same system to Haiti and Nicaragua, and have arranged for the purchase of the Danish West Indies. We kept a dictator out of Venezuela and drove another out of Nicaragua. We interfered to save the former country from European exploitation and frustrated a German plot to control the latter. To what end have we done these things?

We have been troubled for some years by anarchy in the neighboring "Republic" of Mexico, for which we are largely responsible, and have prevented other nations from restoring order and protecting their nationals and interests. Is this advisable? We mediated in the Russo-Japanese war, used successfully our good offices with the European powers in the interest of a peaceful settlement of the Moroccan Dispute of 1905, and are keenly

watchful for a chance to end the present gigantic struggle. What enabled us to act in the instances referred to? What is back of our aspiration to restore peace out of the present condition? Has our policy brought us friendlier relations, and will it do so? Has it moved to our advantage, and will it continue to have such effect? What are the consequences of our representations in behalf of the Jews in Russia and in the Balkan States, in behalf of the Armenians in Turkey and the natives of the Congo in Africa? Our negroes founded the Republic of Liberia. Shall we continue to exercise ourselves for the continuance of that country as a free State?

The commerce of the United States flows along broad lines to every settled land. By parallel routes come back to us, from far and near, things which we do not produce but which necessity or luxury causes us to buy. Our wheat fills English stomachs, our meats make German brawn. Our cotton runs the looms

of England and France and Japan and Germany. These countries are more eager for this product in time of war than they were in time of peace, for it is the base of high explosives. Our agricultural implements are used in Russia, in Argentina and other countries. Our steel makes rails for steam and electric roads in India and China, Egypt and South America. Transformed into weapons of war, it has been of the greatest value to the Allies, and has provoked the German charge that American munitions prevented an early and victorious peace. Our oil is lubricating the engines of war and our gasoline running the motors of the land transports and warships of the Allies. Our manufactured products, grown to a stupendous volume, are competing with European wares in markets everywhere. We have been dependent upon Germany for dyestuffs with which to make our cotton and woolen goods attractive to the eye.

The United Kingdom and France con-

tribute heavily to our supplies of cloths and laces and ornaments. Great Britain sells us immense quantities of crude rubber. Japan, China, France and Italy provide us with silks. France sells us champagne and other wines and liquors; Japan and China, teas. We have no merchant marine; therefore we pay immense freight bills to England, Norway, Japan and other states. We have no direct system of exchange, and as a result hand heavy commissions to London and Paris. We owe immense sums to foreign investors, principally English and French, and our goods pay the interest. Our business at once took advantage of Europe's fight for life, to extend its markets, to build up a merchant marine, to establish banks in foreign lands in order to save commissions on exchange, and to displace English, French and German investments by American capital and thereby to force others to work for us.

Do these activities make for friendship or irritation? Does the other fellow

regard them as a mean advantage taken of him when he is down?

Recall what history teaches. If there is any lesson to be drawn from the past of the modern world it is that the great war-producing factor is the "peaceful struggle" for the control of trade. Nations which once sank their teeth in each other's throats for dynastic or religious reasons, now fight in order that they may sell. Peaceful penetration frequently has served as a preliminary to forcible intervention. We like to say the war with Spain was an expression of fine altruism. It was, in part; and nothing could have been more generous than our withdrawal from Cuba. But President McKinley, in describing the grounds for intervention in that island, specifically stated among them: "The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to commerce, trade and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island."

When the European war broke out, a

congressman observed that "the present insanity of Europe is the logical result of the great nations abroad having permitted their souls to become corrupt, hard, cruel and atrophied, just to acquire wealth and power and imperialism." It is an obvious fact that morality is based upon condition. A standard in a rich, opulent and "civilized" country is not necessarily the standard in another where the struggle for life is keener. God has infinite ways to find expression. So, in Germany we find the people, moved by the memory of the sufferings of their ancestors under Napoleon, struggling for freedom, for unity, for empire, accepting militarism as an evil of necessity, and burdened by the taxes of excessive armaments. We find them growing in population, increasing tremendously their output of manufactures, believing themselves deprived of that "place in the sun" which the Germans regard as their due.

Occupied as they were for years with their internal development, they stood

aloof, careless that rivals were taking rich tracts of land throughout the world; and when they awoke, and looked for places to seize, they discovered that those of any value had already been sequestered by other states. They found their country bottled-up, their water-borne trade menaced, as their militarists taught, by English control of both exits from the North Sea, and competing in foreign-controlled markets under unfavorable conditions. The Germany that prepared for "The Day," that seized the moment of her greatest strength and her adversaries' greatest weakness, that violated solemn treaties, was not the mystic Germany the world loved. It was a Germany that had turned from Kant and Goethe and Schiller, to Treitschke and Bernhardi and Krupp; from the expression of the soul to the materialism of the body.

England, France, Russia and the United States are in no such territorial situation as Germany. England owns one-third of the earth. France has an area one-third

larger than that of the United States. Russia has practically an unlimited area. The population of France is stationary, that of Great Britain is increasing at the rate of eleven per thousand, of Russia at about fourteen per thousand, of Germany at fourteen per thousand. England, France and Russia have ample room in which to turn around, ample preferential markets for their products. The United States, still with plenty of unoccupied land, has concerned itself largely with internal affairs, and only in a haphazard way has it pushed its interests abroad. England, France and the United States prefer the maintenance of the status quo, and have been avowed advocates of international peace. Change, to them, has meant and means danger and perhaps destruction. This is the reason for the strong hold the doctrine of pacificism has gained upon their peoples. No nation thinks of war unless it expects to profit thereby. England and France stood to lose if forced to battle. Because her

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immense land holdings filled her needs though not her capacity, Russia produced a party of peace headed by the Czar, who called the first Hague Conference. But this party could not stand against the centuries-old desire, the centuries-old need, to win free access to the open sea. To a lesser extent, but equally important to her people, the same desire propelled Servia into war. Back of great events there are sometimes what to outsiders seem such little things! One of the interesting bases of Servia's dream of greatness lay in her inability to get her pigs to foreign markets save by the payment of taxes to surrounding states.

Austria-Hungary, touching the sea only by way of the Adriatic, which is under the guns of Italy, sought an outlet into the Aegean Sea and through it to the world, unfettered by the proximity of a strong power. Japan, poor, heavily burdened by debt, crowded to the point of bursting, was forced into Korea and Manchuria, and expects, through the control

of China, to become a second Great Britain. The war has made Japan dominant in Asia, and enabled her to take a forward step in the direction of the mastery of the Pacific. Only one nation — the United States — and that not a military nation, a nation that yearns for peace (some favor it at any price), is at this time in any position to dispute her desire.

It may astonish Americans to know that their country has but one friend in the world — the United States. There are people who say self-interest will prevent England from ever making war upon us, that without our foodstuffs and raw materials she would starve to death and die commercially, that her tremendous investments in this country are and must be a great factor for peace, and that Canada constitutes a hostage the value of which can not be overestimated. To some extent this is true; but as an offset to our wheatfields there are the wheatfields of Argentina and Russia; and England has been battling to gain access to those

of the latter through the Dardanelles. Investments are capable of discharge prior to war or can not be permanently destroyed thereby, and the loss of Canada could be made good by Great Britain's seizure of the Panama Canal, to say nothing of Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines. Moreover, the American people ought not to delude themselves with the idea tht Great Britain is looking with complacency upon our efforts to get her trade and the trade of Germany, for which she has poured out blood and treasure in unstinted measure. Trade is her life, and she will hold and increase it at whatever cost.

With France, we have fewer points of conflict than with most nations. But France was disposed to enter into a European coalition against us in favor of Spain prior to and during the war of 1898. Russia can not understand American hostility, as evidenced during her war with Japan and by the denunciation of the treaty of 1833 by the Taft

administration. Besides, Russia has found her aims in the Far East thwarted by the activity of the American government. Germany never has recognized, indeed always has been antagonistic to, the Monroe Doctrine. She desired land in the Western Hemisphere and resented our claim of a "sphere of influence" which she and other nations must not penetrate. Her feeling against us has been accentuated by the general sympathy we entertain for the cause of the Allies. Japan regards our claim and her own in Asia and the islands of the Pacific Ocean as conflicting.

Thus, even a bird's-eye view of international relations discloses many points of concentration for all the nations against the United States. Let no one think our potential strength will act as a bar against European protection of European interests wherever the latter are menaced. When the Great War ends, Europe will be equipped with superb fleets and armies of millions of veterans. Will they be

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used for the purpose of making Uncle Sam pay at least a share of the heavy debt the war has created?

CHAPTER II

OUR INTERNAL SITUATION AND THE WAR

It is obvious that for a democracy, such as the United States, to play an effective role in international affairs, it must present a united front and speak with a united voice. It may have divergent views upon purely internal questions, for the effect in such cases is domestic only. It ought not to show division upon foreign questions, for it thereby gives evidence of uncertainty and indecision which lends strength to its adversary. It should be cognizant of its vital interests and prepared to protect them. Above all, it should be inspired by the ideals of the spirit and seek to give them realization. If it is to live, it cannot hold back in a great moral situation from fear of self-hurt. It must take its stand boldly,

courageously, and press on to its goal without count of cost.

Did the United States during the long months of the great war show a united front, speak with a united voice? Did it mark out and pursue a definite course of action, in which ideals and vital interests were blended? Neither question can be answered in the affirmative. There were occasions when it did take a bold stand, but did it press on to achieve the things demanded? Again the answer must be in the negative. The reasons for these inconsistencies, these failures, lie in a variety of causes, the first of which is to be found in the lack of real leadership and the second in the absence of a militant nationalism. The president of the United States, especially in foreign affairs, should not wait to ascertain the will of the people before taking action. They can not know the facts as he knows them. Again, he is or should be familiar with the cross currents that develop in connection with any important event, of which they neces-

sarily are ignorant. It is for the president, when he has made himself acquainted with the facts and the law, to act, in other words, to lead. How often during the war, President Wilson delayed representation, how often modified or strengthened communications to foreign governments because of the interpretation he gave to the will of the people! In a note to Germany dated February 10, 1915, for example, protesting against the establishment of a war zone about the British Isles, he declared that the Berlin government would be held to a "strict accountability," if any American ships were attacked or any American lives lost. During the next few months the British liners *Falaba*, *Lusitania* and *Arabic* were destroyed, American citizens were drowned, and attacks were made upon various American ships. The President sent vigorous notes; they are masterpieces in respect of the demands made and the language used. But because the Administration felt the people were content with expression and averse to action,

it allowed the questions raised to drift into the realm of discussion, and when this occurred the end could be forecasted with a reasonable degree of certainty. The really important features of the *Lusitania* note were the declaration that submarines could not be employed as commerce destroyers, and the demand for a disavowal. Eight months later the United States gave formal recognition to the submarine as a commerce destroyer and to the German contention that under certain conditions war on American life was permissible. (1) Subsequently, to the confusion of Europe, and to the injury of our influence abroad, the President switched back to the position that Americans were entitled to travel in safety upon the sea. The agreement which was reached

(1) See note of January 18, 1916, sent by Secretary Lansing to the British, Russian, French and Italian Ambassadors, in which he proposed abandonment of the American principle that merchantmen could be armed for defensive purposes and announced that the government thereafter was disposed to treat all such vessels as auxiliary cruisers.

in February, 1914, in settlement of the Lusitania controversy, but not accepted by the President at the time because of the return of the Central Powers to their submarine operations, was in no sense a disavowal, and while construed by the Administration as an admission of illegality, was not so regarded by Germany.

The lack of a consistent American nationalism, which the war brought home to the people, was realized abroad far more than in the United States. We accepted without comment the existence of a German-American vote, an Irish-American vote, a Scandinavian-American vote, a Polish-American vote, a Jewish-American vote, etc. Likewise without comment, we recognized the political necessity of seeking the ballots of these citizens from over the sea by the selection of candidates of their respective nativities for office. The constitution wisely provides that only an American-born citizen may be president of the United States. This qualification has no application to the

membership of the Senate or House of Representatives or to any other federal or state office. The races which alone are excluded from the polls are the Chinese and Japanese. To secure the backing of the foreign elements that can vote, national administrations have deemed it expedient to insult and flout foreign states and thereby to sow seeds of dislike which some day may sprout a Jasonic harvest of spears.

In a world-wide war, such as broke out on that fateful day of August, 1914, the great questions facing the powers involved, included the attitude of the United States. Had this country intervened, as Theodore Roosevelt intervened in the Morocco controversy in 1905, the war might not have occurred. But nothing was done, beyond the suggestion that the powers observe the Bryan Peace Plan, contemplating an investigation of the causes of the Austro-Servian dispute. Germany rejected this suggestion, just as she had refused prior to the war to enter into a treaty based upon

the Bryan plan. When Belgium was invaded, and the guaranteed neutrality of that nation was violated, the United States, bewildered, confused, appalled, by the approach of the conflagration, sought refuge in "safety first." President Wilson adjured the people to be neutral in thought and act, when every person in the country of any intelligence had made up his mind as to the right and wrong of the struggle, and had squarely placed the responsibility for its occurrence on one side or the other.

But more than this, the impossibility of neutrality in thought and act lay in the character of the American people. There was not a foreign government ignorant of the fact that the "melting pot" had become full and that there had fallen over its sides, unscarred or barely scarred by the heat of the American spirit, solid blocks of foreign nationalities imbued with the Old Country culture and responsive to some extent to the Old Country influence. Upon the vast number of immigrants who, because of economic

or political conditions at home, have come to the United States, we have succeeded in stamping our language, our laws and our literature. From their cross has developed a virile, aggressive race, which, by virtue of its numbers and "push," has made us one of the great world powers.

Nearly fifteen per cent of our total population to-day is foreign born. One-fifth of this is German born, which by far is the largest proportion. Half of the foreigners we have are of northwestern European stock, than which there is no better. An equally large proportion has become naturalized and the vast majority are loyal to their adopted country. But practically all of them remember the agony of their Mother Land. So we find most of those of German extraction not only sympathetic with the German nation in its struggle, for which they can not be criticized, but, what is reprehensible in the highest degree, many of them seeking to influence the policy of the gov-

ernment at Washington in the interest of that nation. Action along the lines for which they agitate would provoke the Allies and precipitate us into war with that powerful combination. There are professional politicians of Irish birth who are aiding and abetting efforts of the unpatriotic Americans of German birth, not because they have love for Germany, but because of their belief that it will be to their personal advantage to clamor against England. There are but few Americans of English and French birth who pursue the equally reprehensible course of urging an unneutral attitude in the interest of the Allies. All these men deserve the severe judgment of the real American, who may be sympathetic with one side or the other, but who places his country's interests first.

It is an unfortunate fact that the sound advice of our first President should fall upon deaf ears to-day as it did when he felt impelled to give it.

“Our citizens,” wrote Washington,

“would advocate their own cause instead of that of any other nation under the sun; that is, if instead of being Frenchmen or Englishmen in politics they would be Americans, indignant at any attempt of either, or any other power, to establish an influence in our councils or presume to sow the seeds of discord or disunion among us.”

Let us hark back over our history and see how administrations, in spite of Washington's injunction, have permitted their foreign policies to be guided by the vote. Professional Irish politicians for years sensibly influenced our national attitude toward England; our Jews compelled diplomatic intervention in behalf of their coreligionists in Russia and the Balkan States; our Hungarians brought us into strained relations with Austria; our Armenians, supported by well-meaning missionaries, almost precipitated war between the United States and Turkey.

The government, in the course it adopted in these several matters, claims

to have been actuated by the broad principles of humanity. Can not such a justification in fact be construed as a reflection upon and an insult to the state approached? Certainly it aroused irritation which has found expression occasionally to our embarrassment. The American people as a whole, however, have remarked the steps taken with general approval, largely because of their strong, pulsing sympathy for the oppressed, and because of indifference or ignorance as to the effects upon themselves of unwise and ill-timed action. For example, the condition of the Belgians, resulting from their conflict with the Germans in the present war, caused a spontaneous movement for the relief of the sufferers. No one stopped to think of the principle of war that it is the duty of the conqueror to succor the conquered. No one stopped to think that the lifting of this burden from German shoulders would irritate Great Britain, France and Russia, which realize that the one sure way for them

to compass the defeat of their enemy is through the exhaustion of his supply of foodstuffs. (For America to feed the Belgians was to enable Germany, in their view, to carry on the war that much longer.) This consideration caused the Allies to decline to permit American charity to reach the Poles.

(And yet, after all, there is something fine about our meddlesome conduct, something that appeals to the nobler instincts, even of the states we addressed and possibly injured.) We had nothing to gain by recognizing, in the person of the great Kossuth, the Hungarian movement for freedom; by agitating against England for a wiser policy toward the Irish; by constantly seeking to better the condition of foreign Jews; by protesting against the wanton massacre of the Armenians; by insisting upon the observance of a policy of humanity toward the natives of the Congo and Peru. Had Germany, instead of invading Belgium, first turned her attention to Russia, the sympathy of the

American people probably would have gone out to the Vaterland. But, on the ground of necessity, the German armies swept into and through Belgium, an inoffensive bystander, with the intention of thrashing France, and when this task was accomplished they proposed to deal with the Russian Bear. The spirit of fair play and respect for the innocent and weak, are two of the most dominant characteristics of the American people. They saw Germany pouncing upon a peaceful nation with which she had no quarrel, merely as a matter of expediency, and their sympathy swelled out to that nation more unitedly than could have been expected in a land among whose inhabitants ten per cent at least are of German origin or extraction. Germany complained that through English control of cables a false color had been put on all news dispatches, and that the real truth was that Belgium, France and England had combined to attack her. It is unnecessary here to say more than this: The bulk

of the American people based their judgment upon the fact that German troops were the first to enter Belgium and that this had been preceded by an ultimatum either to permit them to pass without molestation or to suffer the consequences. Moreover, events quickly demonstrated that England, France and Russia were not ready for war, while Germany was prepared, down to the double set of suspender buttons upon the trousers of her soldiers.

So Germany and Austria-Hungary entered upon the war under a serious handicap so far as the feeling of the American people was concerned. Blunder followed on blunder. The careful diplomacy of years designed to cultivate American friendship was abandoned for a course of action which aroused resentment and tended toward the development of effective nationalism. There were efforts made to coerce the administration to adopt a pro-German policy by threatening it with the opposition of the

German-American vote. There was an attempt to form a political party designed to further German aims. It was announced that German-Americans would not support any candidate for office who did not declare himself favorable to a pro-German neutrality. The Administration, during the political campaign of 1915, was refused democratic endorsement because of German-American opposition. There were movements directed against our peace and security; there were attempts, some successful, to destroy our industrial plants; there were measures enforced to violate our neutrality and to make us the base for one or the other of the contending parties; there were intrigues, plots, conspiracies, designed to involve us in the struggle, and there were even formulated plans contemplating an internal revolution in order to cripple us in case of war with Germany.

It is apparent, even to the most superficial observer, that such events as occurred during the first year and a half of the

war could not have been produced save by years of careful, methodical preparation. Great Britain long prior to the war had ceased to interfere in our internal affairs and had sought by consideration of, and concessions to, the government of the United States, to provide for a state of relations based upon reciprocal understanding and on mutuality of interest.

Germany, on the other hand, labored to undermine the government of the United States through the cultivation of Germans who had become American citizens, and through the use of their influence in behalf of German interests. The policy inaugurated by Baron von Holleben, the German Ambassador during and following the war with Spain, was carried on with remarkable ability by his successor, Baron von Sternburg, and with equal cleverness by Count von Bernstorff. Each of these men, working devotedly for his country, lost no opportunity to secure the greatest number of recruits for the Vaterland and to promote German interests

through them. Germany's anxiety for friendly relations was manifested to the people in various ways: By the construction of the Emperor's yacht, the *Meteor*, in the United States, by the visit of Prince Henry in 1902, by the reception of the American fleet at Kiel, by the exchange of professors between leading universities of the two nations, by messages of good will, a press propaganda, speeches by the Ambassadors and by courtesies extended to prominent American public men. Yet, under the surface, visible only to the officials, ran a strong current of purpose to achieve the things in and from the United States which formed the goal of German statecraft.

Unquestionably, Germany displayed the greatest political activity in the United States of any foreign nation. France relied upon the historic friendship between the two countries to bridge over any question that might arise; and this policy was of easy execution because of the lack of conflicting interests. Austria-

Hungary regarded the United States as so remote, just as the United States looked upon her as so distant, that the two governments jogged along upon a perfectly polite basis, without either taking much interest in the policies of the other. Italy concerned herself with the protection and assertion of the rights of her subjects in the United States. Russia was astonished when American public opinion supported the cause of Japan during the war between those empires in 1904-5. It was a rude awakening from her dream of American gratitude based upon her action in making a naval demonstration at New York and San Francisco in a critical period of the Civil War. But she had bigger fish to fry at home, and she allowed her relations with this country to drift until she received another slap in the face in the form of President Taft's denunciation of the Treaty of 1833. She was inclined to make reprisal, but did nothing, for again she considered her larger interests, and they could not be promoted by

trouble with the United States. Japan for years has regarded this country as a probable enemy because of her belief in the existence of a conflict of interests in the Pacific and China. Then, too, racial antipathy has developed as a result of the treatment of Japanese laborers upon the Pacific Coast. At the same time, Japan has endeavored sedulously to bring about a better understanding, through the visits of distinguished Japanese to this country, through the establishment of news agencies designed to lull our suspicions of her designs, and by other means short of actual interference in our politics.

The objects for which these various nations were working have been furthered by some of our own people. Those who shudder at the possibility of the United States becoming involved in war, no matter how serious the affront to our honor and our vital interests, who advocate the doctrine of non-resistance, and who regard armaments as provocative of conquest, would make their country voice-

less in the councils of the world. Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just, but thrice times thrice is he armed if he have a pistol at his hand. Had the United States, at the outbreak of the war, possessed an adequate fleet and an army of half a million men, there is no question that the lives of our citizens would not have been jeopardized and our rights would not have been violated.

A man who is not blind must see that Japan can do what she wills in China because she realizes the United States, the only great power not at war, is in no position to make good militarily with reference to any protest against her conduct. What is true of Japan is true of other nations; for to them the United States is largely a big, ununified mass, with valuable outlying possessions in the Panama Canal, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines, which it has not sufficient actual strength to defend. It is only the potential possibilities of the American people, their pluck and energy, their

never-die spirit, that have deterred foreign governments from going too far with us.

The attempts to make the United States the tool of foreign nations in the great conflict are by no means the first in the history of our country. It is easy to parallel the course of Germany with that of France in the early days of our infant republic. There were the same plots, the same conspiracies. The French agent was reluctantly dismissed because of his deliberate violations of our neutrality, his attempts to discredit the national administration, and his angry outbursts over the refusal of the United States to go to the assistance of his people. There were counter-plots by the enemies of France. There were measures taken to stir up the Indian tribes against the struggling nation, just as German agents gave aid to the revolutionists in Mexico. The states were drawn closer together by these foreign machinations, and if history repeats itself that will be the ultimate effect of what has taken place since the midsummer of 1914.

CHAPTER III

THE WORLD AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The Monroe Doctrine is a pronouncement by the United States which owes its existence and the respect it has gained from foreign powers to the strength of the United States. It has been called into use within the memory of the present generation against Great Britain, Spain, Germany, Italy, France and Japan. In its inception it was directed against the Holy Alliance, made up of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, which France joined. It has been applied against practically every great power in the world to-day, and in the interest specifically of most, and generally of all, of the republics of the Western Hemisphere. It has been invoked by every administration since its declaration, and in such fashion as to keep its spirit a living force.

The Monroe Doctrine in a sense is altruistic. As a matter of fact, it is the essence of enlightened selfishness. Designed primarily in the interest of the safety of the people of the United States, and born of a purpose to exclude monarchical institutions from the new world, it has worked for the liberty and independence of the republics of Latin-America and has enabled them to proceed in their development along the lines they themselves desired. Had there been no Monroe Doctrine, had the United States not pursued determinedly its purpose to prevent foreign powers from obtaining or extending footholds upon the two American continents, this hemisphere would today be a scene of strife, offshoot of the great European war, just as it was prior to the time the United States became concerned over the destiny of the territory lying to the south of it.

The Monroe Doctrine has no place in international law, though one of its bases is sound in international law — that of

self-preservation. It was limited by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain, which was superseded by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. On two occasions it is alleged indirectly to have received international recognition, both times at the instance of the American delegation to the Hague Conference which drafted conventions for the peaceful settlement of international controversies. Fearing the first convention might permit European signatories to suggest arbitration of disputes arising under the Monroe Doctrine, the American delegates made a formal reservation that nothing contained in the instrument should be considered to require any abandonment of the traditional attitude of the United States toward questions purely American. No objection whatever was offered to this reservation. A similar declaration was made in connection with the convention adopted by the second Hague Conference.

It is further contended that Great Britain assented to the Monroe Doctrine

in the British Guiana-Venezuelan dispute, and that Great Britain, Germany and Italy did so in the Venezuelan controversy of 1901-2.

In view of the way in which solemn treaties have been regarded in Europe as "scraps of paper," however, it is evident that mere acquiescence in declarations by representatives of the United States would not be considered for a moment as of binding force by any nation deeming it to its interest to violate the Monroe Doctrine.

The Monroe Doctrine had its origin in European conditions and was suggested by George Canning, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and later Prime Minister of Great Britain. It is one of the consequences of the disturbances of the balance of power in the Old World. Its importance to the struggling nation at the time of its inception in 1823, as well as to the country to-day, is best shown perhaps by the following extract from a letter written by Thomas Jefferson to President Monroe:

“The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom.”

It is unnecessary to recite the details of the origin of the Monroe Doctrine; they are known to the world. But it is interesting to call attention to the fact that when the doctrine was proclaimed, it went far beyond the suggestion made by Secretary Canning. President Monroe, in his annual message of 1823, declared the United States would consider any attempt to extend the European system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power," he said, "we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition, for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly feeling towards the United States." Monroe

further served notice that the American continents were "henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

Canning's position, as described by Stapleton, was simply that Great Britain would not permit other European powers to interfere on behalf of Spain in her contest with her American colonies. So far from assenting to the view that the unoccupied parts of America were no longer open to colonization from abroad, the British Prime Minister held "the United States had no right to take umbrage at the establishment of new colonies from Europe on any such unoccupied parts of the American continent." The Monroe declaration, therefore, struck at England as well as at Russia, with which the United States was involved in a dispute concerning the Northwest Territory, and, as Calhoun remarked, gave offense to England to such an extent that she refused to cooperate with us in settling the Russian question. The Oregon dispute

with Great Britain, of easier recollection by the famous "fifty-four forty or fight" slogan, was an expression by the Crown of its refusal to recognize the non-colonization principle of the Doctrine.

To-day the Monroe Doctrine is of high importance to Great Britain; and if it were desired by us, unquestionably she willingly would accord it formal recognition. As a matter of fact, from time to time, as her interests dictated, she sought to infringe and even violate it; but the firm adherence of this government to the original declaration prevented success attending her efforts. The culmination occurred in connection with the boundary dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela. President Cleveland in 1895 sent a special message to Congress in which he used this language:

"It may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation, and is essen-

tial to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our national life, and cannot become obsolete while our Republic endures. If the balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among the governments of the Old World, and a subject for our absolute non-interference, none the less is an observance of the Monroe Doctrine of vital concern to our people and their government."

When Great Britain joined with Germany and Italy in the blockade of Venezuela in 1901-2, Lord Salisbury declared his government had no intention "to land a British force, and still less to occupy Venezuelan territory." As a matter of fact, there was little popularity in England in connection with the use of the navy to force the payment of a debt by an American state; so this declaration met with entire approval among the Eng-

lish people, and was followed by acceptance of President Roosevelt's proposal for an arbitration of the claims. Since that time there has never been the slightest question in the minds of the American government as to Great Britain's acquiescence in the Monroe Doctrine. British statesmen realize its value to their own country. They have come to understand that the non-colonization principle is as much in their interest as it is in that of the United States; and, above all, that the declaration that the dominions of one European power can not be alienated to another, constitutes in fact a guarantee by the United States that it will not permit any of Britain's enemies to take possession of British colonies in the Western World. In short, the United States is a powerful potential backer of British control of territory in the Western Hemisphere. Likewise, it is the backer of the possessions of France in the West Indies and in French Guiana, and of those of the Netherlands. The Danish West Indian

Islands are about to pass into our possession.

Germany has been and is in a position totally different from that of Great Britain in connection with the Monroe Doctrine. She regards it with disfavor. The records of the Department of State contain reports of coaling bases, always at strategic points, established ostensibly for German merchant lines, and later in reference to the erection of wireless stations. They call attention to German emigration to southern Brazil and German interest in the prosperity and development of these representatives of the Vaterland. In 1901, the government learned that German warships were inspecting the Island of Santa Margarita, off the coast of Venezuela, with a view to its occupation as a naval base. Subsequently, information was received that secret negotiations were under way for German acquisition of two harbors in Lower California for the Kaiser's "personal use." Interposition by the United

States prevented these various essays from meeting with success.

The real test of the Monroe Doctrine, so far as Germany was concerned, arose in connection with the blockade of Venezuela in 1901-2, which already has been referred to. Russia and France had renewed their treaty of alliance, leaving Germany isolated upon the continent; and Great Britain, which suspected Russia's designs in the Near and Far East and was on edge with France as a result of the latter's African adventures, was in a mood to listen to overtures. The result was an agreement between Germany and Great Britain, in which Italy joined, to collect certain claims pending against Venezuela, which the latter seemed indisposed to pay. Lord Lansdowne's assurance already has been quoted; that of Germany, as expressed by Baron von Holleben, the Kaiser's Ambassador in Washington, was as follows:

"We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in

our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory. . . . If this measure [a blockade] does not seem efficient, we would have to consider the temporary occupation on our part of different Venezuelan harbor places and the levying of duties in those places.”

President Roosevelt had anticipated German action by inserting in his annual message (December 3, 1901), eight days before the formal declaration above quoted was made, the following reference to the Monroe Doctrine:

“The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. . . . We

do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power."

In spite of the German declaration, the Roosevelt administration was seriously concerned about the course of Germany. The previous activities of that government in this hemisphere, as well as information as to its purpose which had come to Washington, caused the impression that any "temporary" occupation by Germany would be translated into permanent occupation. So John Hay, then Secretary of State, protested against the "peaceful blockade," the form of coercion adopted, as illegal and a contradiction in terms, and declared that its enforcement against the rights of neutrals would not be tolerated. Mr. Hay also urged arbitration, but without success.

President Roosevelt thereupon took personal control of the situation. At a

moment when the Venezuelan crisis reached its point of greatest tension, he requested the German Ambassador to come to the White House. He explained to him the concern felt by the government and people of the United States at the course of Germany and her allies; that the United States could not look upon "a temporary occupation" of "fifty-seven years" as anything other than a permanent occupation; that he and the American people desired the continuance of the most friendly relations with Germany, but that if within ten days he did not receive an official declaration from Emperor Wilhelm of his purpose to submit the Venezuelan dispute to arbitration, he would instruct Admiral Dewey, in command of the North Atlantic Fleet, which had been sent to the Caribbean Sea ostensibly for "maneuvers," to proceed to Venezuela and forcibly prevent the occupation of territory, temporary or otherwise.

Baron von Holleben called attention to the fact that the Emperor had refused to

arbitrate, and that this was final. President Roosevelt informed the Ambassador that he did not propose to argue the matter, that he had come to the conclusion which he had set forth, and that he believed the Ambassador might deem it wise to transmit the conversation to his government. Baron von Holleben asked the President if he realized the meaning of his words, and suggested that it might precipitate war.

"Now that you have said the word, Mr. Ambassador," substantially replied the President, "it will mean war unless your government acts as I have pointed out."

For a week, Baron von Holleben remained away from the White House. Then he called and entered upon a casual conversation. As he rose to go, without having mentioned the Venezuelan question, the President asked him if he had heard from his government. He replied that he had not taken the President's utterances seriously, and had not deemed

it necessary to cable Berlin. Thereupon he was advised that Admiral Dewey would be instructed to proceed to Venezuela twenty-four hours earlier than originally intended. This produced an emphatic protest, which did not shake the President's determination. Mr. Roosevelt assured the Ambassador he had no intention to humiliate the Emperor or Germany, that nothing had been put in writing, that if the Emperor would agree to arbitration, he would issue a statement praising his action and would give the public the impression that the Emperor had taken the initiative. Mr. Roosevelt added that within forty-eight hours he must have an acceptance of his program or Admiral Dewey would sail.

On the morning of the day the ultimatum was to expire, Baron von Holleben with a beaming face advised the President of his receipt of a dispatch that the Emperor would arbitrate. Thereupon, the President made a formal announcement, giving the entire credit of this step

to the German Emperor. The greatness of the service which Roosevelt's diplomacy rendered to the United States has not been realized by the people, because of the necessity of keeping them in ignorance of the lengths to which he was forced to go.

Thus Germany learned that the Monroe Doctrine was a living reality. Nevertheless, it is known to this government that it was the influence of Germany which defeated in the Danish parliament a treaty made some years ago, ceding the Danish West Indies to the United States. A few weeks prior to the outbreak of the great European war, Germany demanded participation in the control of the customs revenues of Haiti, ostensibly in order to protect the loans of German subjects to the Negro republic.

On September 3, 1914, a little more than a month after the outbreak of the war, Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, sent a note to the State Department denying reports that Germany, if victorious, would seek expansion

in South America. He explained that his statement did not cover the entire hemisphere, because no question had been raised as to alleged German designs upon any other part of the New World than that directly specified. On October 26, 1914, the Ambassador asserted the right of Germany to invade Canada, despite the Monroe Doctrine, since that Dominion had participated in the war by dispatching troops to the European battlefields. Such a measure undoubtedly would arouse the American people; for the occupation of Canada would mean the establishment of a great military power on our northern border and a grave threat against the peace and integrity of the Union. If Germany should undertake a step of this kind against any British possession in this hemisphere, she would arouse the grave concern of the United States, and in all human probability would draw us into war.

Japan's interest in the western world, while of recent manifestation, has had a

significant effect upon the development of the Monroe Doctrine. Occupied as Japanese statesmen were by the reorganization and expansion of their country in the Far East, it never was believed they would direct their national ambition across the Pacific; and this particularly in view of the fact that by an exchange of notes with the United States during the Roosevelt administration, Japan had tacitly accepted the Monroe Doctrine by declaring that "the policy of both governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region above mentioned (the Pacific Ocean)." Yet this government was aroused in 1912 by reports that a Japanese corporation was preparing to purchase land upon the shores of Magdalena Bay, Mexico, which furnishes an admirable site for a naval base and the occupation of which by a foreign power would menace the Pacific route between the United States and the Panama Canal.

The danger was met by the adoption by the Senate of a resolution introduced by Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, under the terms of which foreign corporations, subsidized or controlled by their governments, are forbidden to acquire land in the Americas which is so situated as to menace the safety or communications of the United States. There is complaint abroad that the Lodge declaration is a forerunner to the exclusion of *all* foreign corporations, and diplomatic representatives in Washington expect this to happen as the logical outcome of President Wilson's Mobile speech against Latin-American "concessions." It may be said in passing that when the Senate adopted the Lodge resolution, it for the first time made the Monroe Doctrine a congressional policy; theretofore it had been exclusively an executive policy.

The activity of a Japanese corporation thus resulted in a reiteration, a development, if it may be called such, of the

Monroe Doctrine. But Japan did not take this rebuff to heart. She sent a special envoy to Mexico — the first she or any other Asiatic state had ever sent to that country — to investigate conditions there. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, Japanese warships were reported to be establishing a base on Lower California. This report was disposed of by a naval investigation which disclosed that a Japanese warship had been wrecked and that efforts were being made to salvage her. Attention is called to this incident merely to show the suspicion and concern which exist in Washington as to Japanese purposes in this part of the world.

It is interesting now to pass to the Latin-American view of the Monroe Doctrine. With the principles of that Doctrine the people of Central and South America are in hearty accord. But they object to the appearance of overlordship which the support of the Doctrine seems to give. Their pride is touched by such declarations as

that of Secretary of State Olney: "The United States is practical sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interposition." Moreover, there are Latin-Americans who point out that the Doctrine, while forbidding European and Asiatic conquest of the territory of their countries, contains no such prohibition against the author of the Doctrine; and proof of the predatory instinct of the United States is found in our acquisition of territory from Mexico, our alleged protectorate over Cuba, Haiti and Santo Domingo, our intervention in Nicaragua, and our participation in the separation of Panama from the Republic of Colombia. Therefore, South Americans urge the United States to adopt as a corollary to the Doctrine the same interdict upon its conquest of American territory as it has imposed upon cis-Atlantic, and cis-Pacific states. The state of this feeling was set forth in an article printed by the *North American Review* of September, 1915, from the pen of John

Barrett, Director General of the Pan American Union.

“There is also the suggestion that all Latin-America is opposed to the Monroe Doctrine,” said Mr. Barrett. “But what is interpreted as opposition to the Monroe Doctrine is not a feeling against the original Doctrine and the conditions under which it was declared, but against a kind of casual interpretation of it in the United States which carries the obnoxious intimation that the United States has a ‘holier than thou,’ a supreme, position among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Latin-America, as a matter of fact, believes in a just and unselfish interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine — an interpretation which would make it a Pan-American principle or policy, by which all the countries of North and South America would stand for the sovereignty and integrity of each.”

The suspicion as to our purposes under the Monroe Doctrine has led to reports of the formation of an alliance by Argen-

tina, Brazil and Chile, of negotiations for a secret treaty between Chile and Colombia, in connection with the Panama Canal episode, and in various other ways. It was intensified by President Wilson's declaration that the United States was the champion of constitutional government in the American hemisphere, and by his announcement that he would not recognize a government which attained power through force instead of by the will of the people — a position which was wholly at variance with precedent and which he was compelled to abandon within a little more than a year of its declaration, in four specific cases: China, Peru, Haiti, and finally Mexico. In other words, Mr. Wilson was forced to return to the wiser policy pursued by his predecessors and first sounded by President Monroe in his last annual message to Congress in 1824.

"These new states," said the astute Monroe, "are settling down under governments elective and representative in

every branch, similar to our own. In this course, we ardently wish them to persevere, under a firm conviction that it will promote their happiness. In this, their career, however, we have not interfered, believing that every people have a right to institute for themselves the government which, in their judgment, may suit them best. Our example is before them, of the good effect of which, being our neighbors, they are competent to judge, and to their judgment we leave it, in the expectation that other powers will pursue the same policy. The deep interest which we take in their independence, which we have acknowledged, and in their enjoyment of all the rights incident thereto, especially in the very important ones of instituting their own governments, has been declared and is known to the world."

It is evident that sovereignty implies obligation. So long as certain of the Latin-American republics which were in a chronic state of revolution, did not

menace the peace and safety of the United States, so long were they left alone. But when by their acts and by their refusal to pay the debts they had incurred, they paved the way for foreign intervention, this government was forced to intervene.

When Cuba was liberated by American arms from the yoke of Spain, the United States aided it in the establishment of a stable government. When Santo Domingo was threatened by foreign powers, President Roosevelt, upon the request of that government, established what may be called a financial protectorate over the island, which made for its financial rehabilitation and the development of order and tranquility. By this action President Roosevelt asserted the same right of self-protection against other American states as against Europe. The Taft administration sought to make arrangements for Nicaragua and Honduras similar in many respects to that adopted in the case of Santo Domingo. The Wilson administration took little action with reference to Haiti. The

treaties with Haiti and the one with Nicaragua finally were ratified.

What was aimed at in these several conventions was the establishment and maintenance of peace. With the kind of government in power the United States had no concern. The like motive caused the Taft administration to take the wholly unprecedented step of excluding General Castro from Venezuela, on the ground that he was a stormy petrel, and General Zelaya from Nicaragua because of his dictatorial conduct. President Wilson went even further than Taft when, in his annual message of December, 1913, he made this statement:

“There can be no certain prospects of peace in America until General Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority in Mexico; until it is understood on all hands, indeed, that such pretended governments will not be countenanced or dealt with by the Government of the United States. We are the friends of constitutional

government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions."

If we can force a constitutional government in Mexico, why may we not do likewise elsewhere? ask those in authority in South America. If we can go that far, when the people of certain states are not ready for such liberty, may we not go even further and say they must accept our officials to show them how to run their countries? And if this step should be taken, is not the next inevitable step annexation to the United States?

President Wilson sought to dissipate the cloud of suspicion through which Latin-America views the United States, by inviting Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and subsequently other Latin-American powers, to aid him in settling the Mexican question; by disclaiming, in his annual message of December, 1915, any idea of guardianship or thought of wards, in connection with the southern republics, and by proclaiming "a full and honorable association as of partners

between ourselves and our neighbors in the interest of all America, North and South." This thought received expression in proposals by Secretary Bryan for treaties with the Latin-American republics, containing a mutual guarantee of each other's independence and integrity, and the maintenance of a republican form of government by each.

Such treaties would strike at the vital interests of the United States as well as those of the southern states. There ought to be, of course, no thought of alliances with the southern republics, though a natural desire prevails for a solidarity of the Western Hemisphere, based upon its geographical separation from European and Asiatic concerns, the peculiar social conditions which it possesses, the character of its peoples, the vastness of its area and the richness of its soil, and finally the development of a public law which these distinctions have assured. It is evident, however, that since the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration based upon this govern-

ment's right to protect itself, it cannot, to quote the words of Elihu Root, "be transmuted into a joint or common declaration by American states or any number of them. If Chile or Argentina or Brazil were to contribute the weight of her influence toward a similar end, the right upon which that nation would rest its declaration would be its own safety, not the safety of the United States. . . . Each nation would act for itself and in its own right, and it would be impossible to go beyond that except by more or less offensive and defensive alliances. Of course, such alliances are not to be considered."

The real Monroe Doctrine, which exists to-day as in the time of Monroe, has not changed. Its fundamental base is that American territory shall remain American. The reason for its present enforcement is even more lively than it was when proclaimed. The Caribbean Sea and Central America are our back yard. South America is nearer than it was in 1823.

The growth of Argentina, Brazil and Chile reduces the chance of their territory being used for European or Asiatic colonization purposes. But the peace and safety of the United States, the impelling motives for the proclamation and maintenance of the Doctrine, must be guarded; and this can be accomplished only through the determination and ability of the American people to enforce universal respect for their traditional policy.

CHAPTER IV

THE CARIBBEAN SEA PROBLEM

The progress of events has forced another policy upon the United States, a policy included in the Monroe Doctrine and, like the Doctrine as a whole, based upon the recognized right of self-preservation. It relates to the Panama Canal, to the territory lying between the Rio Grande and the southernmost boundary of the canal zone, to the countries washed by the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean in the vicinity of the Canal, and to the islands which dot those reaches of water. More than ever, the United States cannot permit any European or Asiatic power to gain possession of footholds in that important region. More than ever, it must keep within its control the communications between its continental limits and the Canal. Indeed, the policy of the

United States must be to consolidate its position in Mexico and Central America, in the Caribbean Sea and in those countries whose geographical situation lends them strategic value in connection with the waterway.

The importance of the Caribbean Sea to the American people was realized by the founders of the Republic. They saw in its islands natural appendages to the North American continent, with one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores. The commanding position of that island, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian seas; its situation midway between our southern coast and the important island of Santo Domingo; its safe and capacious harbor of Havana, fronting a long line of our shores, destitute of the same advantage; the nature of its productions and wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, lent it an importance in the sum of our national interests, in the view

of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, with which that of no other foreign territory could be compared, and little inferior to that which bound the different members of the Union together. It was appreciated by Adams, as it had been appreciated by his predecessors in office, that the people of the United States could not look with indifference upon any attempt to transfer Cuba and Porto Rico, or, indeed, any of the West Indian Islands, from their owners to other powers. What was true of the islands was true likewise of Mexico and Central America, in fact, of all the nations on the Caribbean littoral. So we find the American people manifesting a supreme interest in the maneuvers of Great Britain, France and Spain and subsequently of Germany, in connection with all the territory lying directly to the south of the Rio Grande.

Thus there always has been a Caribbean Sea question, and a Central American question. The pivot of the question has shifted. To-day it is the Panama Canal.

The southernmost boundary of the zone through which the waterway has been constructed has become in fact what President Hayes predicted — a new coast line for the United States. It must be defended as we must defend our continental coast lines. Our sole dependence for the continuance of the Canal in American ownership and under American control lies in our fleet. The time may come when we will deem it necessary to have another line of approach to the Canal in order to provide for its defense; and that line can be secured only through control, most probably possession, of the territory lying between the Rio Grande and the Republic of Colombia.

The interest of the United States in this part of the world is an interest so vast that it may be regarded as comparable to that of ancient Rome in connection with the Mediterranean Sea. Any attack on this nation by a European power undoubtedly would be launched from an island in the West Indies. Any attack by an Asiatic

power upon this nation unquestionably would be directed from Mexico. Two distinct ends would be gained by such a maneuver: first, the severance of communications with the Canal, and, second, the establishment of a base for operations against the Union. He who seizes the Canal annuls the Monroe Doctrine and dominates Central and South America; he deprives the United States of a mighty defensive and offensive weapon, and he enjoys possession of a second world highway of the greatest political and economic value.

The statesmen of Europe, as those of America, have realized the importance of the Canal; and this is responsible for the efforts they have made in the past to gain control of the Panama and Nicaraguan routes, as well as the Tehuantepec route through Mexico. It is responsible also for their efforts to acquire islands which command the Canal routes, and it has inspired, blindly, to be sure, a similar policy on the part of the United States.

Sentiment is strengthened immeasurably by economic need, and above all by the necessity of self-preservation; and doubtless that was in the mind of Elihu Root when he said:

“It is plain that the building of the Panama Canal greatly accentuates the practical necessity of the Monroe Doctrine as it applies to all the territory surrounding the Caribbean or near the Bay of Panama. The plainest lessons of history and the universal judgment of all responsible students of the subject, concur in teaching that the potential command of the route to and from the canal must rest with the United States and that the vital interests of the nation forbid that such command shall pass into other hands. Certainly no nation which has acquiesced in the British occupation of Egypt will dispute this proposition.”

It is obvious that the peace and safety of the United States forbid particularly the transfer by one over-seas power to

another of any territory in this region. It is obvious, furthermore, that the value to each of the republics of a stable and orderly government is no less important to them than it is to the United States. It follows as a necessary corollary that there must exist closer relationship between the United States and those republics, if possible without jeopardizing their independence. Chronic revolutions, refusal to pay debts, insults and injury to foreigners, invite retaliation, and retaliation awakens the keen apprehension of the American people. Orderly and stable government assuring discharge of the obligation to protect life, liberty and property, ought not to be too great a price to pay for independence.

It was this sound view which was responsible for the adoption of the Platt amendment in connection with Cuba, the application of the Roosevelt financial protectorate to Santo Domingo, and the negotiation of similar protectorates over Hayti, Nicaragua and Honduras. It is the base

for our guarantee of the independence of Panama and our diplomatic intervention in Venezuela and Mexico. And by virtue of the fact that our policy of "hands off" necessarily imposes obligations on us to those shut out, more and more the over-seas states are urging American redress of wrongs perpetrated upon them and their subjects. Their attitude in this respect has been manifested especially in Mexico, where revolutions have destroyed foreign life and foreign property. It is no secret that had not the European situation promised war there would have been intervention as against the United States in the neighboring republic prior to 1914.

That we have not met our responsibility in the case of Mexico is apparent to those who have followed the course of deplorable events there. It is the international point of view more than the internal struggles in that republic which arouses the concern of those who have their country's interest at heart. European nations have looked with amazement upon a pol-

icy of "watchful waiting," which has permitted the assassination and murder of American citizens, as well as of their own nationals, the destruction of hundreds of millions of foreign property, and the creation of a condition that common humanity, which has been a mainspring of action by the United States in the past, demanded should be terminated. They have seen revolutionary and bandit chiefs insult and flaunt the United States; they have seen the American flag dragged in the dust, American soldiers and marines killed and wounded, and no reprisals, save a temporary occupation of Vera Cruz, enforced. They have witnessed the observance of two distinct and antipathetic policies: one a refusal to recognize a dictator, the other the recognition of a dictator.

There developed abroad the conviction that the United States did not mean what it said, that American life and American rights could be violated with impunity, that American representations could be disregarded and American demands treated

contemptuously. President Wilson's course in Mexico reduced American prestige to a stage so low that it is difficult to find a parallel in our entire history. This had a bearing on our international situation which the people little appreciated, for it left us without a friend in the world; and the President was compelled, in order to prevent our isolation, to regain the friendship of a foreign power by complying with the British demand for equal tolls on all ships passing through the Panama Canal.

There are some who think that Mexico is a far cry to the Panama Canal. Yet Mexico has a direct relation to that waterway, not only from a strategic but from a commercial point of view. The genius of Diesel has dethroned King Coal, and the future will see greater and greater use of petroleum in place of the fuel to which the world has become accustomed. The employment of petroleum will revolutionize the entire realm of naval strategy and deep sea trade. Thus this mineral oil

becomes of vital moment in the sphere of military and political interests. It follows that every maritime nation, including the United States, must consider the oil production of the world.

Great Britain, with that far-sightedness which has played such an important part in her development, realized long before other states the value of petroleum, and quietly began to acquire properties where they would be of strategic use. The English Pearson interests, the head of which, Lord Cowdray, has close relations with the British Admiralty, have acquired oil fields in the State of Vera Cruz and on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, as well as in other parts of Mexico. The wells in operation have an estimated annual output of one hundred million barrels; that is to say, nearly half the annual production of the United States. In a few years, Mexico may become the first petroleum producing country in the world, surpassing the United States in the output of this product. By reason of its closer proximity to

the Canal, which it can supply by pipe lines, yet to be built, Mexico thus has an enhanced importance with respect to the waterway. Besides the oil wells in Mexico, foreign interests have acquired mines in Colombia and Ecuador. It is apparent, therefore, that petroleum, "which seemed to be a gift of the gods to the economically weak Latin republics of Central America and of the neighboring countries of South America, has, on account of the Panama Canal, become the bone of contention of the great powers, which circumstance alone would justify us in speaking of a Central American question —" this from Germanicus in *The American Journal of International Law*, April, 1914.

The United States is both feared and hated in the states over which it has established a suzerainty. In Mexico, our armed intervention and withdrawal and our diplomatic intervention have created a feeling bordering on contempt. A way for a brigand chief to gain popu-

lar favor was and is to attack the United States. Huerta did so, Villa did so, and Carranza has found it desirable to do likewise. The Central Americans have been greatly exercised over the invasion of Nicaragua by American marines and their continued occupation of Managua, the capital of the country — an occupation which has lasted three years. The expulsion of President Zelaya by the Taft Administration aroused the apprehension of the dictators of Guatamala and Honduras. Costa Rica is comparatively friendly in sentiment. As to Panama, her existence rests upon the good will of the United States. It would seem there ought to be gratitude there; but the feeling against our country has found expression in attacks upon our soldiers who go from the Zone to the city of Panama. Colombia has never forgiven what she regards as President Roosevelt's "rape" of Panama, but is prepared to accept the tidy little sum of \$25,000,000 to salve her honor. The United States

having kept Castro out of Venezuela, the people of that country fear it may intervene again to expel some other ruler to whom it has taken a dislike. Of the West Indian republics, Cuba, in spite of our intervention which produced her freedom, in spite of our magnanimous action in leaving her to pursue her own destiny, and in spite of our support of an orderly government, entertains no feelings of gratitude for us. The same is true of Santo Domingo, which we are helping to peace and tranquility. Our marines, only recently, have been engaged in "pacifying" Haiti, much to the dissatisfaction of native trouble-breeders who hold to the "inalienable right of revolt" whenever it is to their interest to exercise it.

Bankers of foreign governments have lent money to practically all these countries, and at different times most of them have defaulted on their debts. Secure in our protection, they have gone on in their reckless course with full knowledge that none of the European nations can chastise

them for their aggressions and bring order out of chaos without antagonizing the United States. Sooner or later some power will feel itself compelled, in vindication of its own honor and the protection of its citizens and their rights, to adopt forcible measures. In the last twenty years this has been done by the British against Nicaragua, and by the British, Germans and Italians against Venezuela. One happy development of the situation, so far as the safety of the United States is concerned, lies in the fact that the Central American and West Indian states are now borrowing money from American bankers. We have financed Cuba and Santo Domingo, neither of which can obtain loans without our approval; we are paying a subsidy to Panama; and we are arranging to finance Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras and Haiti. Since the war began, other loans have been made to Latin-American states. The time will come when this grave question of finance will be settled through the hold-

ing of a large proportion of the loans in the United States.

The powers in the West Indies, besides the independent states mentioned, are the United States, whose flag flies over Porto Rico and Culebra; Great Britain, which, in addition to British Honduras in Central America, and British Guiana, South America, owns the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Turks, Trinidad, Tobago and the Leeward and Windward Islands; France, which controls Martinique, St. Pierre and Miquelon, besides French Guiana in South America; Denmark, which has a burden in St. Croix, St. Thomas and St. John; and the Netherlands, which owns Curacao, six hundred miles from Panama, and Dutch Guiana in South America.

American acquisition of the Danish West Indies will remove a constant source of worry to our statesmen. It is evident that if Germany should acquire control of Denmark or Holland, she would claim their colonies; and the United States

would be forced to apply the Monroe Doctrine as against her annexation of the West Indian possessions of the nation conquered or annexed. Through the perspicacity of Senators Root and Lodge, a grave danger was averted for the United States during the time William J. Bryan occupied the office of Secretary of State. Mr. Bryan negotiated with Denmark and the Netherlands his ill-considered peace treaties, the effect of which, had the Senate ratified them, would have been to compel the United States to submit to arbitration the question of its right to forbid the acquisition of the Danish or Dutch West Indies by another European power. A similar instrument, negotiated with Ecuador, would have had a like effect with reference to the Galapagos Islands, off the coast of Ecuador, which furnish an admirable base for operations against the Panama Canal.

In our contemplation of the commercial value of the Canal, we have, in a great measure, lost sight of an equally prime

reason for its construction — the tremendous increase in military strength which it affords us. The Suez Canal is a great convenience to Europe; the Panama Canal is a necessity for the United States. The easy and quick transportation it permits for our fleet from one great ocean to the other is worth the money and time and brains we have expended in its building. For this advantage and for the Monroe Doctrine, it was necessary for President Roosevelt to insist upon an American guarantee of the Canal in contradistinction to the European guarantee of the Suez Canal. The international status of the two canals is practically the same, unless the United States itself be engaged in war. To preserve the international status of the Canal this country is obligated:

1. To keep the Canal free (for passage but not equal in respect of tolls, despite the Wilson interpretation) and open to all private vessels of nations observing the rules prescribed in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.

2. To keep the Canal free and open to men-of-war, even to those of belligerents when the United States is not a party to the war. If the United States be at war, its enemy will not be permitted to use the Canal.

3. To preserve the neutrality of the Canal and protect the property there in the same fashion as it does the neutrality of its own ports.

4. Alone to guarantee that the Canal shall be kept free and open in accordance with the provisions of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.

5. To protect the Canal by permanent fortifications and a military garrison, this under a right granted by a treaty with Panama.

In other words, the Canal is an American waterway, of great political and military, as well as commercial, importance to the United States, and absolutely under the sovereignty, control and protection of the United States. It must be regarded, to quote the report of the Isthmian Canal

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Commission, as but "one link in a chain of communications of which adjacent links are the Caribbean Sea on the east and the waters of the Pacific, near the Canal entrance, on the west," and it is evident that, again to quote the report, "unless the integrity of all the links can be maintained the chain will be broken." Necessity, vital necessity, therefore, forces the United States to play a dominant role in the region described, to guard jealously against foreign encroachment, and to maintain a strength which will prevent its hegemony from ever being successfully assailed.

CHAPTER V

THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC

Fateful is the problem of the Pacific for the American people. That ocean, so vast that all the nations of the earth might well live in peace upon it, has become a scene of turbulent struggle which is certain to develop into deadly conflict. Fifty years ago William H. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State, pointed out that this ocean, its shores, its islands and the vast region beyond, would develop into "the chief theater of events in the world's great hereafter." Equally prescient, Former President Roosevelt, declared "the Pacific era, designed to be the greatest of all and to bring the whole human race at last into one comity of nations, is just at the dawn." The Panama Canal has been constructed since these two statesmen made their predic-

tions; and this link of the west and the east already is having an influence upon, and will play an increasingly important role in connection with, the destiny of the human race.

The problem of the Pacific comprises many questions, each of which is of vital moment to the United States. These questions primarily are Racial, Industrial, Commercial, Territorial and Strategical. On this great ocean, the Occident and Orient meet, not on common but on alien ground. Here two powerful races face each other—the yellow and the white. Here there is a struggle between the cheap though relatively inefficient labor of the former with the expensive and more highly specialized labor of the latter. Here there is a determined, tenacious rivalry for markets. And as the natural consequences of these conflicts of peace there is a reaching out by the aggressive nations for territory and the adoption of means less for their own defense than as an assistance to the aspirations which

consciously or subconsciously their need creates.

What is the need of the United States in the Pacific and what are the aspirations it has created? Do we require an outlet for surplus population? Not at all. Do our conditions impel us to acquire territory for colonization purposes? We have a superfluity of land. Our underlying desire, our underlying aim, is to make money, to do so by expanding our trade, by the development of markets, by the investment of our surplus capital. In pursuance of this purpose we gave the world a new nation in the form of modern Japan; we have figured largely in recent years in the international maneuvers to preserve the integrity of China and equality of opportunity therein, and we have acquired islands which we are turning into fortified bases both for our continental defenses and for pushing the commercial dreams which subconsciously inspire us. Our so-called higher motives, too, play a part in our Pacific development. We like

to think of ourselves as the regenerator of the Philippines, the "first friend" of Japan, the preserver of China for the Chinese, of the Latin-Americas for the Latin-Americans, and above all as the champion of Christianity and the bearer of the Message of Hope to the heathen.

The development of means of transportation, the increase of our manufactures, and the activity of our missionaries and traders have brought the United States into direct contact with at least six hundred millions of people, more than one-third of the human race, who inhabit lands bordering on or lying in the Pacific. Of these, four hundred million are inhabitants of weak, helpless China, the prey of stronger powers, and sixty million are the sturdy sons of Japan, which is highly organized and ambitious to become the Great Britain of the Pacific and Far East. The balance populates Canada and the countries of Central and South America, having access to the Pacific and the Pacific Islands. The myriad wants of

these people we partially supplied, at a cost to them, for the year prior to the Great War, of \$250,000,000; and in return they sold us products, during the same period, valued in the neighborhood of \$350,000,000. Our own trade with our Pacific dependencies has attained the respectable figure of \$160,000,000 annually. As time goes on this commerce will swell to enormous proportions, provided of course it is safeguarded and assisted by the government of the United States.

There is no clearer truth in history than that nations and races may be developed or destroyed through their industries, and that national greatness is dependent upon the competition between the workshops of the world. The records of our State Department reveal the careful manner in which the government always has fostered our foreign trade. It has been done, however, in haphazard fashion, rather with the thought of the day than of the morrow. There has been no settled policy, no definite goal. We seem to have

been driven on in spite of ourselves, to be the creatures of Manifest Destiny. And this forward movement, caused by our virility and aggressiveness, has made us a power to be considered by the nations we face, as it compels us to consider the effect of their attitude toward and policies upon us.

The United States is in control of the western flank of the Pacific Ocean. In fact, its coast line extends from the Arctic to the Antarctic Circle. Besides its own continental territory, which comprises Alaska as well as the Pacific Coast states and the Panama Canal Zone, it must protect Canada and all the Latin-American republics from foreign occupation. In the Pacific itself it has various islands: those lying off the coast of Alaska; Hawaii; Guam, in the Ladrone group; the Philippines; and Tutuila and Rose, in Samoa. Through the possession of Hawaii it has an advanced naval base for its own defense which commands all the trade routes across the North Pacific.

In the possession of Guam it has a site for a naval base which commands practically every trade route in the Far East. In the possession of Tutuila it has a site for a naval base which commands every trade route in the South Seas. The Philippines, also, furnish a base of value for operations across the China Seas. But the real fortresses of our control lie in Hawaii, Guam and Tutuila, and no Oriental enemy will pass over the sea to attack us until those fortresses, when they shall have been completed, are destroyed or contained.

Thus the American nation is in a magnificent strategic position for the furtherance of its more or less unformulated aims, and, above all, for the assertion of its political and military purposes. It is in a strategic position where it can meet the shock of conflict with the Asiatic races, provided, of course, that it has the requisite military strength. That conflict is no bogie of the future; it has begun. In the Pacific, the United States has been forced to adopt two totally variant policies. It

has excluded the Far East from the Western Hemisphere, and, until the Wilson Administration came into power, it insisted upon entrance into China upon identically the same terms as those enjoyed by other nations. It wants no bar upon American activities in the Far East, but it has excluded Chinese and Japanese not only from its continental limits but from its islands. China has acquiesced in the policy of the American government; Japan has done so officially, but proud as she is, it is natural that she resents the stigma of racial inferiority our action has stamped upon her.

A mere superficial glance at conditions in the Pacific is sufficient to show that the great present-day powers in that ocean are the United States, Japan, Great Britain and Russia. Spain has been eliminated. Portugal has only the settlement in China known as Macao. The Netherlands, pursuing a policy of passive resistance, and without the military strength to oppose aggression, is drifting along until the time

in the future when it shall be deprived of its Far Eastern possessions. Indeed, the government at The Hague is desperately afraid of becoming involved in the war on the side of the Central European Powers; for it realizes that such a step would mean an end to its colonial empire. Therefore, it guards its neutrality with zealous care. France, which has Tonquin and Indo-China wrested from China, also has possessions in the South Pacific; but France is not a colonizing nation, nor is she successful commercially. Rather does her ambition lead to influence, power, military glory. Italy sought a foothold in China when the great scramble for territory was on in the closing years of the nineteenth century, but was thwarted by the United States. Russia endeavored to release herself from the grip of the Arctic North by acquiring Port Arthur and Dalny, on the Yellow Sea, but was driven therefrom by Japan. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which terminated the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, not only pushed

back Russia into Northern Manchuria, but, by according Japan sovereignty over the southern half of Sakhalin Island, placed the Tokyo government in a position to command every route to and from China down to the Philippines. The tremendous strategic importance of this situation has impressed students of world conditions; for the especial struggle of the Pacific is for the control of the trade and rich resources of the Chinese Empire, and the nation which dominates the routes of traffic is certain to enjoy an advantage of untold value over its rivals. By holding the Philippines the United States would serve its own interests as well as those of the White Race. The continued possession of this archipelago, which the naval genius of Dewey gave to us, would entitle the American people to a voice in Far Eastern affairs, supply them with a commercial as well as a military base, and assure them a splendid opportunity to further their trade activities on the Asiatic continent. It is a crime against America's

future for the Democratic Party to seek to cast these valuable islands adrift.

While Russia has no colonies in the Pacific, she has an immense coast line in the frozen North; and her ambition to acquire Chinese territory makes her a factor to be considered in the problem opening before the American people. Prior to the Taft Administration, the United States, without much thought about it, believed it desirable for Russia and Japan to be kept apart in the extreme Orient. This unformed, or rather unexpressed, policy received a deathblow at the hands of Philander C. Knox, when Secretary of State. Mr. Knox, with no conception of the immense interests involved, indeed, believing he was carrying out the Hay Doctrine of the Integrity of China, proposed the neutralization of the Trans-Manchurian Railroad—the artery connecting Siberia with Port Arthur, control of which had been divided by Japan and Russia in the Treaty of Portsmouth.

The moment knowledge of the Knox

plan reached the chancellories of Petrograd, then known as St. Petersburg, and Tokyo, that moment the two governments, realizing the menace to their interests, came together. The present alliance, by which Japan is giving loyal aid to Russia in the great European struggle, had its roots in the understanding reached after the Knox proposal was made. Whether that alliance deals with China and the Pacific, as has been reported, is not of certain knowledge. Even a blind man can see, however, that there does exist a far-reaching understanding which undoubtedly has a direct bearing upon the interests of the United States.

Japan's position in the Far East and the Pacific was established by the war with Russia. It was recognized by Great Britain immediately prior thereto, which entered into an offensive and defensive treaty with the Tokyo government. Great Britain was moved to take this step by the rapid rise of Germany as a commercial competitor, and by the latter's naval development, which unbalanced the Euro-

pean situation. It was necessary for her to concentrate her fleet at home, and at the same time to protect her interests in the Far East; and the Japanese navy assured this over-seas protection. The first treaty of alliance between the two powers stated as its purpose "a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the extreme East," "the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea," and "equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations."

The results of the war enabled Japan to absorb Korea, in spite of the self-denying pledges she had made; and this necessitated a revision of the treaty, which was made in 1905. The new treaty contained no reference to the prior guarantee of Korean independence, and, in fact, contained a clause under which Japan's right to do as she pleased in the "Hermit Kingdom" was recognized. Korea as an independent country was promptly obliterated. While reiterat-

ing the agreement to insure the independence and integrity of China and the Open Door in that Empire, the convention broadened the original purpose by extending mutuality of action to the defense of the territorial rights and special interests of the contracting powers "in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India."

That the treaty could be applied against the United States was evident; but six years later Great Britain made such application impossible by declaring the instrument could not be invoked against any nation with which she had a treaty of general arbitration; and she has such a treaty with us. But she did not have a treaty of the kind with Germany, and Japan, therefore, entered into the war against the Central European Powers. The Japanese did so gladly. The European struggle furnished them the opportunity they desired to humiliate Germany and eliminate that country from the Far East. The Nipponese people had never forgiven the Kaiser for joining Russia

and France to oust them from the Liao Tung Peninsula, upon which Port Arthur is situated, which their arms had acquired during the war with China in 1894-95. So, after the war of 1914 had begun, Tokyo sent an ultimatum to Berlin. It was couched in identically the same language as that used by Germany twenty years before. Demands were made for the retirement of Germany from Kiao Chou, the advanced base which the Kaiser's government had grabbed, and the abandonment of the sphere of influence which the Province of Shantung comprised. Germany refused; and Japan, without regard to the neutrality of China, which she violated as the territory of weak states always will be violated under the plea of military necessity, inaugurated military measures in coöperation with Great Britain, that for the moment at least have put an end to Germany's aspirations in the extreme Orient. Great Britain, requiring all her available ships for operations in different parts of the world, requested

Japan to aid her in dispossessing Germany from the Pacific Islands. That aid was forthcoming, with the result that we find Japanese forces occupying the Ladrone Islands, other than Guam; the Pelew and Caroline Islands, to the westward of the Philippines, and the Marshall Group. These islands furnish valuable outlying sites for bases, and could be utilized against the Pacific bases of the United States.

Will Japan withdraw from the islands she has occupied when the war ends? It is to the interest of the United States that she shall surrender them. For her to remain in possession would be to violate a specific agreement with this government. Following the dispatch of the American fleet to the Pacific in 1908, Elihu Root, Secretary of State, and K. Takahira, the Japanese Ambassador, signed an agreement declaring, among other things, that it was "the wish of the two governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce in the Pacific Ocean," and they asserted that the policy

of both, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, "is directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo" in that region. The agreement further noted an identic policy for "the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China" and for the support of "the independence and integrity" of that country. As one of those used by President Roosevelt in the negotiation of the above agreement, the author can say that what the United States desired and obtained in making the agreement, was a public disavowal by Japan of an aggressive design upon any of the Pacific Islands, particularly the Philippines, belonging to the United States; but it was realized that it was to the interest of this nation that there should be no further change in the status of the territories in the Pacific, and it was for that reason the instrument was couched in such broad terms.

From a strategical point of view, the British Empire has a distinct superiority over every other nation in the Pacific. It

is established on both flanks of the ocean, with fine, safe harbors for its fleets, and is in possession of Australia, and other islands in the South Seas. With its genius for colonization, it has brought peace and prosperity to the territories it has occupied. It has made Australia and New Zealand a white man's land. It has an impregnable base in Hong Kong and the hinterland, and it has a sphere of influence in the rich, fertile valley of the Yangtse-Kiang, China. In Canada it has a dominion of unlimited possibilities, a dominion which is certain to have an important relation to and influence upon the Pacific problem. Both Canada and Australia have the resources for manufactures, and as they increase in population they will become sharp competitors of the United States and Japan in the markets of Asia. In the unforeseen case of war with Great Britain, the United States, so far as the Pacific is concerned, would be menaced from the naval base of Esquimault, British Columbia, and from Australia and New

Zealand. That these British Colonies would be no mean antagonists has been demonstrated by the heroic conduct of the Canadians in Northern France and the unfaltering courage of the Australians and New Zealanders in the ill-fated adventure against the Turkish Dardanelles.

It must be a matter of deep regret to all Americans that the relations of the United States and the British Dominions in this hemisphere and across the Pacific have been injuriously affected by events of the present war. The action of a "yellow journal" on the Pacific Slope in supplying information to the German cruisers operating in the Pacific at the outbreak of the European struggle, has aroused bitter feeling in Australia. Canada cannot understand the failure of the United States to aid her and the British cause in the fight for ideals and principles, which, if lost, will directly affect the future of this nation. As a matter of fact, there is a great similarity between the ideals and institutions of Canada and Aus-

tralia and the United States. There exist also between the United States and these British Dominions, indeed with the entire British Empire, common interests based upon the same vital needs. Both must stand for the Open Door in China and the exclusion of Asiatics. For them, therefore, to have any other than a convergent policy contemplating in the end effective coöperation would be to strike a blow at the supremacy of the White Race in the great Ocean of the Future.

The Panama Canal has made the United States the greatest industrial power in the Pacific. That waterway has brought our eastern factories nearer to the western coast of Central and South America, the British possessions in the South Pacific, and the Extreme Orient. We have a marvelous organization of industrial machinery, which must be supplemented by adequate financial, shipping and commercial machinery in the Pacific regions. Our merchant marine flag, which waved over a few ships on this ocean after the

Civil War, has disappeared, as a result of ill-advised legislation, and our freights are being carried more and more by Japanese vessels. Foreign banks have attended to most of our financial transactions. Our agents are in many instances natives, or non-Americans. But in spite of these handicaps, handicaps which must be removed, we have made a long start toward securing that supremacy which our geographical location, our resources, and our tremendous industrial and commercial activity justify us in striving to obtain. In the pursuit of our necessitous ambition, we must expect friction. It is to be hoped that it will be peacefully resolved; but we should not forget the years-ago prediction of the far-sighted Prince Ito, the Bismarck of the Japanese Empire:

“The next great war will take place in Europe. It will be followed by a second conflict—the struggle for the mastery of the Pacific.”

CHAPTER VI

SHUTTING THE OPEN DOOR

Momentous events have occurred in China since the European war began, events which may be said to mark the beginning of a new era in the history of that weak and, therefore, long suffering country. It is an era pregnant with the promise of Japan's assumption of control in the Far East, of the termination of territorial aggrandizement there by the White Powers, and of a long step toward realization of the dream of the wonderful Island People—Asia for the Asiatics.

It is not at all astonishing that Japan seized the opportunity which the breaking out of the European war provided. Rather would it have been astonishing had she not done so. Japan could no more afford to have the great military powers of the West sitting upon her threshold

than the United States could afford having them in Latin-America. Her vital interests were threatened when Russia sought to acquire the great Chinese region of Manchuria and the Kingdom of Korea. Had Russia succeeded, Japan would have felt the menace of an arrow pointed directly at her heart. The success of Japanese arms in the war of 1904-5 destroyed this menace and made possible the annexation of Korea and the assertion of Japanese dominance over Southern Manchuria.

There remained, within close proximity to Japan, the military force of Germany, entrenched at Kiao Chou. This port had been seized by the Kaiser in 1897 as compensation for the murder of two missionaries, and thus constituted an assertion in the Far East of the policy of the "mailed fist." Several motives inspired Japan to attack this stronghold—the ridding of China of another European power, the extension of Japanese interests and influence, and revenge. When Kiao Chou

was conquered, the Japanese government turned its attention to the larger questions which concerned it—the increase of its power in China. It made demands upon the Peking government which were granted in May, 1915, under threat of war, demands which conclusively established Japanese control over Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; which made the Province of Shantung a Japanese instead of a German sphere of influence; which strengthened Japan's position in the Province of Fukien, gave her a voice in the rich Yangtse-Kiang valley, up to that time claimed as a British sphere of influence, and forced China to declare that it would not cede or lease any territory or island along the coast of Shantung to any foreign power. In short, Japan's paramountcy received treaty recognition; and had it not been for foreign pressure, the Tokyo government would have compelled compliance with other demands which would have placed political, financial and military control of the entire

Chinese nation formally in Japanese hands.

How was this accomplished? Principally as a consequence of the preoccupation of Europe and the unwillingness of the United States to do more than make paper protests. Great Britain, thinking more of Europe and her over-seas possessions than of China, looking to the preservation of the larger rather than the smaller interest, deemed it wisdom to acquiesce in Japan's demands. The possibility that Japanese troops might be needed in the Indian Empire to oppose invasion or suppress revolt, doubtless also influenced Britain's attitude. Russia, in agreement with Japan, expected territorial compensation in Outer Mongolia; besides, she could not oppose force to Japan, even had she been inclined to do so. Moreover, Great Britain was willing that Japan should acquire control of coal and iron mines in the Yangtse region in order that that country might obtain the raw materials needed in the manufacture of munitions for Russia. France, in Southern Asia and

with a sphere of influence in the neighboring southern provinces of China, was manacled by the necessity of concentrating every ounce of her strength against Germany. The single nation Japan had to reckon with was the United States.

Would the American people remotely consider the idea of going to war in behalf of China? It does not take an instant's reflection to answer emphatically in the negative. Our interests in China are rather of the future, important as are those of the present in religion and trade and education. It was with a view to safeguarding them, to promoting them by the attainment of influences and prestige, that the United States early concerned itself with the destiny of China. We aided materially in breaking down the policy of exclusion, which the Chinese government was enabled to pursue until the time of the Chino-Japanese war in 1894-5. Following that war, an era of encroachment by the foreign powers was inaugurated upon the Empire. Moved by political

as well as commercial reasons, they endeavored to partition the country among themselves through the creation of spheres of influence, the acquisition of sites for strategical bases, the construction and operation of lines of railway and the securing of vast and loosely defined concessions covering the entire land.

John Hay was Secretary of State of the United States at the time; and his Far Eastern adviser was William Woodville Rockhill, a man who combined knowledge born of long experience in China and statecraft to an unusual degree. In a memorandum, which some day will be published, Mr. Rockhill called the attention of Mr. Hay to the prospect that if the United States stood aloof from the Chinese situation, its trade would be destroyed, its religious and educational interests restricted, and its influence and prestige reduced to a cipher. With Mr. Hay, to be convinced was to act. He issued, in the summer of 1899, his famous circular to the powers, advocating as a

world policy the establishment of the Open Door in, and the maintenance of the integrity of, the Chinese Empire. Politically the step was important, for it contemplated general international agreement in behalf of Chinese integrity and Chinese independence, and commercially it was important, particularly for the United States, since it gave promise that our trade would be unrestricted throughout the length and breadth of China. The prestige which the war with Spain gave us, the support of Great Britain, and the situation of the powers at the time, enabled Mr. Hay to wring reluctant assents to his declaration. For five years he struggled to clamp his purpose, and when death took him from the State Department it was with the comforting knowledge that a new American policy had been written upon the book of international relations.

The policy was incorporated in the treaties of alliance between Great Britain and Japan; it was observed in the Treaty of Portsmouth, which terminated the war

between Russia and Japan; it was the base of an agreement between Japan and France in 1907, and between the United States and Japan in 1908. The agreement with the United States specifically provided that for the defense of the Open Door, Japan, after consultation on the measures to be taken, would join with the United States, whenever occasion might arise, to support "by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in the Empire."

These several treaties and agreements made Japan politically what her geographical proximity to China and her military strength justified her in asserting—the guardian of the Open Door, and indeed its chief exponent. What she has done to take advantage of her position is a matter of history. British and American trade steadily declined in Southern Manchuria because it could not compete with Japanese trade, supported as the latter

was by geographical proximity, preferential customs and railway rates and shipping bounties, and by the refusal of Japanese traders to pay China's internal taxes.

For some years prior to the war the attention of Great Britain and France became centered more and more upon other parts of the world. They were forced by events to sacrifice their commercial interests in China and to give Japan greater freedom in economic matters. The United States, with strange indifference to the important interests slipping from its grasp, permitted the duty and responsibility which the Hay policy enjoined on it, to pass to Japan. The act that practically terminated America's influence on the fate of China was President Wilson's withdrawal from the so-called Six-Power Loan, which had been a subject of negotiation between the powers and the United States during the entire Taft Administration. While the President declared that "our interests are those of the Open Door, a door of friendship and mutual

advantage " and that " this is the only door we care to enter," he served notice of his declination to take any step to preserve the principle which the American people had so heartily approved and which had received at least lip-service from the rest of the world. It was realized by China and the powers interested in her situation that so far as the United States was concerned it would no longer concern itself over the integrity of the Far Eastern country. More than ever the responsibility for China's preservation devolved upon Japan, particularly in view of the strained condition of affairs leading up to the Great War developing in Europe. Had not the war broken out, it is likely there would have been events in China quite as important as those which have occurred since the struggle began. Japan for years had been paving the way for the enunciation of her Monroe Doctrine, and the time was about ripe for her to act.

Whether the kind of a Monroe Doctrine that will be favored by Japan will

be similar to the American policy, remains to be seen. Our Doctrine has not kept this country from acquiring territory at the expense of the neighbors it was designed to protect, nor is it likely Japan will hesitate to extend her holdings at the expense of China, if it is to her advantage to do so. The fact should not be forgotten that China is densely populated, and that Japanese immigrants will labor in keen competition with the natives. Statistics show there has been a very small emigration to Manchuria, and a large proportion of those who hastened to that region after the Russo-Japanese war have returned home. The Japanese can not work successfully alongside the Chinese even in their own island territory of Formosa. This economic fact undoubtedly will figure heavily in Japanese calculations, and the chances are that the Tokyo government will be inclined to pursue a policy of exploitation rather than of annexation — for a time at least.

Japan is in a position to adopt the policy

which is best suited in her judgment for her own interests. Manchuria is as good as Japanese to-day, and although Japan has agreed formally to return Kiao Chou in Shantung to China when the European war shall end, she has provided for the creation of an exclusive Japanese concession, besides an international concession, at that port. The commercial, industrial and railroad rights which Germany enjoyed in the province have been transferred to and will remain in the hands of Japan. It is evident, therefore, that Shantung's destiny ultimately will be that of Manchuria. Being in control of Manchuria and Shantung, Japan has her grip around the intervening Province of Pe Chili in which Peking, the capital of the nation, is situated. Again, Japan forced China to engage not to grant to any other power the right to build a shipyard, coal-ing or naval station or other military establishment on the coast of the Province of Fukien, which lies south of the Province of Che-Kiang, which borders on Shan-

tung. This engagement was required by Japan because an American firm had a concession for constructing a dockyard at a Fukien port, and because China, to curb Japan, desired the United States in that province. Looking at the map of China, it will appear, therefore, that strategically, Japan controls the entire coast of the country, a control which is strengthened by her ownership of the islands lying in proximity to the coast.

The Wilson Administration followed closely the course of the Chino-Japanese negotiations. The representations it made undoubtedly influenced the Japanese government to agree to the postponement of the demands included in what is known as Group V, which, more directly than those accepted, struck at the very heart of China's sovereignty. The postponed demands will be pressed at a more opportune moment. Of that there is no doubt. In the meantime, the United States has contented itself with notifying China and Japan that it "can not recognize any

agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy commonly known as the Open Door Policy." When the American Charge d'Affaires presented the communication in Tokyo, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked what he was to do with it. "I presume it is intended for record," he is said to have responded. "It will be filed," gravely replied the Minister.

With China's plight, the American people undoubtedly have sympathy. Yuan Shih Kai endeavored to keep his country out of the war by every means in his power. He was not successful, and the nation over which he ruled already has paid the price of enforced participation in the conflict, just as Belgium has paid the price. Heroic Belgium deliberately chose to sacrifice herself upon the altar

of right; China pursued the easier alternative, just as she did during the Russo-Japanese war when she permitted the belligerents to fight in Manchuria. In spite of the conclusion of hostilities, however, the war is not yet over for China. There is little doubt that the capable German agents in China have fostered and are fostering dislike of the Japanese among the natives. There is little doubt they fanned the ambition of Yuan Shih Kai to restore the empire with himself as emperor. They figured his ambitious action would provoke a revolution in the southern provinces, that this would precipitate Japanese intervention, and that the necessity of providing for her own troops would cause Japan to diminish the supply of munitions she has been furnishing to the Russian government. When Yuan Shih Kai ascends the throne, President Wilson undoubtedly will accord him formal recognition in the imperial dignity, just as he accorded him recognition as president of the republic, this in spite of

Mr. Wilson's declaration, issued seven days after the Administration began, that he would not recognize a man who achieved rulership through force.

With Japan exploiting the resources of China, it is apparent Nipponese power will be tremendously increased. Her Manchurian railroad leases having been extended, she will be able to borrow money upon these lines. Her more solidly established interests in Manchuria, the rights she has acquired in Shantung and her title to the Hanyang Iron Works, will improve her credit. Altogether, the war has proved a profitable venture for Japan, and a correspondingly unfortunate occurrence for China. It is to be regarded as certain that when the European Peace Congress assembles, China will seek to have international action in her behalf. Intimations concerning this purpose already have been made. But Japan will insist that the treaties she has signed with China are not a subject for action by the Peace Congress.

A grave question in this connection will confront the United States. Its interference would be resented by Japan, and might even lead to war, for that government is determined to continue on the way its feet are planted. In this determination probably it will have the backing of Russia, which is gripping northern Chinese territory. Nor are Great Britain and France apt to curb the ambitions of an ally. So the American people must consider carefully how far they are justified in going, not merely in behalf of China but in support of the interests they have in that country and which the future promises. It is argued that the real hope of the Chinese people lies in the preservation of the integrity of so much of their territory as remains to them and in their development under the tutelage of Japan. Conquerors have come and gone in that mysterious land, but China persists. Mongol and Tartar and Manchu have risen to power and disappeared. Japan is at the dawn of her day; but if history

teaches anything it ought to teach her statesmen that there is a point beyond which there will be absorption of Japan by China rather than absorption of China by Japan.

CHAPTER VII

THE JAPANESE PORTENT

There are portentous questions at issue between the United States and Japan. The latter country, forced into the stream of modern progress by the frowning guns of Commodore Perry, has become in the short space of fifty years a great power, entitled by its military strength to sit at the council board of nations. Within twenty-one years it took part in four wars, from each of which it emerged with greater renown and greater prestige, and, as a result of three of them, with extended territorial boundaries. Its rise necessarily has restricted the operations and ambitions of other powers, including the United States. The keen sense of nationalism which has been developed, the pride of race which achievement has intensified, and the military character of a people

always bred to arms, have led to an insistent purpose to be recognized as the equal of any race in the world. Japan has demonstrated her prowess at the expense of two Caucasian nations — Russia and Germany. She has likewise demonstrated her prowess upon an Asiatic nation — China. Her troops acquitted themselves with distinction during the Boxer Revolt in China, when they fought side by side with Americans, Germans, British, French and Russians.

Unquestionably, the most serious problem in the intricate relations of the United States and Japan is that which has arisen as a result of the attitude of the Pacific Coast states toward Japanese subjects. This question has three angles: first, our policy respecting Japanese immigration to continental United States and its dependencies; second, the position of Japanese lawfully in the United States and its dependencies; third, the entrance of Japanese into Latin-America. As to the first, Secretary of State Elihu Root effected a temporary

adjustment by negotiating a "gentlemen's agreement," under which Japan herself controls emigration to the United States and its dependencies. This was, and is, a makeshift, though it has worked well as a result of scrupulous observance by the Tokyo government. It is evident, however, that our policy is discriminatory, disguise it as we may, in view of the fact that American doors are open on equal terms to all Caucasian races. Regarding the second question, California in the spring of 1913 enacted a law prohibiting Japanese from owning land in that state. Japan promptly protested, declaring the law to be "unfair, unjust, inequitable and discriminatory" . . . "primarily directed against Japanese, and prejudicial to their existing rights" . . . "inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty in force," and "opposed to the spirit and fundamental principles of amity and good understanding upon which the conventional relations of the two countries depend."

The United States insists that the legis-

lation passed by California, and Arizona as well, is not political but economic, and in no sense to be regarded as part of any general national policy of unfriendliness. During the discussion which took place between the representatives of the two governments, Japan referred to the naturalization laws of the United States under which, she stated, "Japanese subjects are as a nation apparently denied the right to acquire American nationality," which was "mortifying to the government and people of Japan, since the racial distinction inferable from those provisions is hurtful to their just national susceptibilities."

✓ In this last declaration, we have the real germ of Japan's complaint against the United States. It is no new issue for Japan. Under the Roosevelt Administration, the "school question" developed in California, there were assaults upon Japanese, and there was a movement on the Pacific Coast directed against these people, in which the labor unions were involved. President Roosevelt earnestly

deprecatcd the agitation, and, in order to remove the basic trouble, he recommended, in 1906, the passage by Congress of an act providing for the naturalization of Japanese coming to the country with the intent to become American citizens. The recommendation was not adopted. Flushed by the success of its arms against Russia, the Japanese government assumed a vigorous attitude. For the moral effect such action would produce, the President ordered the battleship fleet to make a tour of the world, proceeding via the Pacific Ocean and Japan. Prior to the departure of the fleet, the "gentlemen's agreement" was negotiated, and after the visit of the men-of-war to Japan, the Root-Takahira Agreement, defining the policies of the two governments in the Pacific and the Far East, was signed. Under pressure by the President, Congress authorized American participation in the Tokyo Exposition; and though it early became apparent that the Exposition would not be held, nevertheless the American Commis-

sion was dispatched to Japan in order to show the warm desire of the Washington Government to maintain close and friendly relations with that empire.

Count Komura, one of Japan's Ministers for Foreign Affairs, who deserves a high place in international history, describes the attitude of his government in 1909 as follows:

“As regards the question of measures unfavorable to the Japanese which are pending in the California legislature, the Imperial Government, relying upon the sense of justice of the American people, as well as the friendly disposition of the federal government, confidently hopes that such questions will not lead to any international complications.”

Count Komura's hopes have not had realization. In order to manifest her friendliness for the United States, in spite of the failure to adjust the differences in relation to Japanese subjects, Japan voted \$1,000,000 to participate in the San Fran-

cisco Exposition. Hardly had this decision been reached, when the anti-Japanese land ownership proposal was debated in the California legislature. A personal appeal by Secretary of State Bryan failed to stop the passage of the bill. Thereupon followed the negotiations containing the quotations given. These negotiations reached such a tense stage that Mr. Bryan, when asked by the Japanese Ambassador if the decision of the United States was final, replied:

“There can be no last words between friends.”

The two governments entertained a proposal to adjust the controversy by the conclusion of a special convention. The solution considered has never been divulged; but whatever it is, it became apparent that it was not approved in Japan, for with a change in ministry at Tokyo a change occurred in the attitude of the government there. The negotiations ended for the moment; but there is not the slightest doubt they will be revived by Japan, per-

haps in a manner that will awaken the American people to the gravity of this question, and, above all, to the purpose of the Far Eastern Empire to assert the doctrine of equality.

That Japan postponed pressing the United States to settle the question she regards as so vital, a question which directly affects her prestige in China, where she has been struggling to assert her paramountcy, may be attributed, not to the military power of the American nation, but to the attitude of Great Britain. Humiliating as it may be to our people, who think they can "lick the earth," there is not the slightest doubt that pressure from London exercised a potent influence upon the Japanese procedure. It was not to the interest of Great Britain to have Japan and the United States involved even in a condition of strained relations. She needed her ally free to protect her interests in the Far East, and events justified the soundness of her judgment.

Moreover, it was appreciated in London

that the sympathy of the British Empire would be with the United States in a struggle with Japan, for identically the same question as to the Japanese exists in the British Pacific dependencies as in the western American states. Without the moral support of Great Britain and without the ability to borrow money in London, which lack of such support would mean, Japan was not in a position to force the negotiations to the point toward which they were trending. The suggestion has been advanced that the dispute might be arbitrated under the General Arbitration Treaty of 1908; but it is doubtful if the United States Senate would agree to arbitrate a question affecting the internal situation in the United States and the economic life of the American people. Mr. Bryan desired to negotiate with Japan his treaty for the investigation of all disputes. Japan declined to consider the proposal, realizing the situation in this country was such that an investigation of the immigration controversy would not be

authorized, and that if the treaty were made it would be made only to be broken.

To pass now to the Japanese view of the American policy with reference to Latin-America. It is difficult for the Japanese people to regard this policy as essentially different from that of the "Open Door" in China. Both in the broad sense have exclusion as their guiding principle. Both are directed against the acquisition of territory by foreign nations. As has been disclosed, the "Open Door" policy in China has been undermined. The Monroe Doctrine, however, still maintains. Japanese have found conditions of life easier in Mexico and other Latin-American states than at home or in China. The law of gravitation from a poor, crowded land, to a rich, fertile, sparsely-settled region set their feet eastward. They were told to stop in 1912 by the Lodge Resolution, which was inspired by reports of a Japanese settlement on Magdalena Bay, which the Japanese Government was alleged to be pro-

moting through a Japanese corporation. The resolution declared the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of a harbor "or other place" on the American continent by any corporation or association having relations with a foreign government, provided such harbor "or other place" threatened the communication or the "safety" of the United States. It is quite true this resolution does not discriminate against Japan; it applies equally to all nations. But it was provoked by a Japanese settlement, and, therefore, is considered to have been directed especially against Japan.

Japan knows her own situation and aims; she is not certain of the purposes of the United States. Nor is this surprising in view of the day-by-day world measures we adopt, the lack of a permanent, well-thought-out policy, which is desirable not only for ourselves but for other nations. We were for the integrity of China in 1899; we practically abandoned that principle fourteen years later.

Secretary of State Knox sought, or rather the Japanese so believed, to deprive them of the fruits of their victory over Russia, by proposing the neutralization of that part of the railroad running through the Chinese Province of Manchuria which had been ceded to Japan. Then came the scheme of American capitalists to build the Chinchow-Aigun Railway as a rival to the South Manchurian Railway. Next followed the proposal of the four-power loan of \$50,000,000, the interest to be guaranteed by all the unhypothecated resources of Manchuria and containing a provision that China should apply to the four powers for future loans, "thus dethroning Japan from her primacy in Manchuria." To quote a Japanese view: "To Japan, Manchuria is hallowed ground. Upon this plain twice she fought for the sake of her national existence. Two billion yens of her treasure were spent, and the precious blood of one hundred and thirty thousand of her noblest sons was shed for the honor of their beloved Nippon."

Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that Japan, as well as Russia, which controlled the railroad in Northern Manchuria, rejected the Knox neutralization proposal, that she prevented the construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway, and that she displayed keen resentment at the loan idea. It can be put down as a cardinal fact of Japanese policy that she will never voluntarily relinquish the rights she has obtained in Manchuria, and indeed will defend them to the last extremity. Likewise, she will defend the additional rights she has acquired since the war began, and, as developments have demonstrated, she will pursue without consideration of consequences the policies that she deems her vital interests in China and the Pacific demand.

That the United States will pursue precisely the same course with reference to its vital interests is equally obvious. What then will be the result? Are the many manifestations of friendship this country has given to and for Japan and that Japan

has given to this country, to be blown away in the swirl of war? God forbid. Japan does not forget that the sword of Perry was in fact an olive branch, and that the wisdom of Townsend Harris was the guide for her youthful feet in the early years of her modernity. She recalls with gratitude our refusal of the Shimonoseki indemnity, and the willingness displayed by us to revise the old treaties and thus make her internationally sovereign throughout her entire territory.

The statesmen of Japan know better than the people the great value of the moral sympathy this nation gave their land in its war with Russia, and above all the extent of the service rendered by President Roosevelt in imposing peace upon the government of the Czar. It may be permitted now to say that it was Japan who asked for peace, not Russia; that it was only by the exercise of a high order of diplomacy that Mr. Roosevelt was able to bring the Slav Emperor to the point of entering upon the negotiations, which

resulted in the Treaty of Portsmouth. Yet the Japanese people were led to believe that it was the United States which estopped them from securing an indemnity from Russia, and this belief is responsible to some extent for the feeling that the United States deliberately has endeavored to keep Japan poor. It is hardly necessary to say this government had nothing whatever to do with Russia's rejection of the indemnity demand. Had Japan not abandoned her attitude in this respect, the war would have continued.

But such hostility as exists in Japan toward the United States could be supplanted by the old-time friendship if there were a real statesmanlike effort made to compose our differences. There is, in theory, certainly no irreconcilable difference between the two nations. If the United States were to authorize the naturalization of Japanese as President Roosevelt recommended, if Japanese were to receive identically the same treatment as Europeans, if there should be general

restriction of immigration, applying to all other nationalities the same as to Japanese, it is evident the fundamental cause of bad feeling would be removed. Whether this remedy is practical is another question. The Pacific Coast states regard the Japanese as an economic, even a political, menace. It is impossible to expect under present conditions a congressional enactment authorizing the naturalization of these people. The hyphenated situation in the United States has revealed the necessity of placing a limitation upon immigration, and this undoubtedly will lead to the passage of a law raising the bars against most of the applicants for admission. A policy amounting to practical exclusion would be welcome to Europe, which will desire to keep its men and women at home in order to repair the ravages of war. If the policy should be made to apply to Japan in precisely the same fashion as to Caucasian nations, the stigma of racial inferiority which humiliates the Far

Eastern people, would be removed.

Japan would then believe we stand for the "Open Door" at home as we have stood for the "Open Door" in China. There would be, in other words, legal equality; and this would have an important influence not only upon the relations of the two countries but upon their policies in the Pacific and in China. The people of the United States frequently forget they have as much to learn from other nations as those nations have to learn from us. They can not overlook the fact that while geographically, Japan lies in Asia, she is the most western of Eastern nations; that she has a culture and civilization which justify respect; that by remarkable energy, in the short space of half a century she has reconstructed her whole scheme of political and social life with standards approximating those of the West; and that she has a strong government able to maintain peace and order at home and capable of fulfilling pledges made to foreign nations.

CHAPTER VIII

THE WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE

Neutral diplomacy never has had to deal with more intricate problems than those arising out of the European struggle. The introduction of novel engines of war, such as the submarine, the aeroplane, the wireless telegraph, asphyxiating gas, and new forms of explosives, the substitution of mechanics for man as motive power, and the imperative need of petroleum products for operations in the air, on the surface of the earth, and beneath the sea, have created conditions unknown to humanity in the past. The precedents of prior wars frequently lack application to modern incidents; and there is no guide save natural justice difficult to define and practical common sense hard to get.

But the underlying principles of humanity and international law which are

founded on natural justice, are as lighthouses in a raging sea of blood. They are immutable, because they appeal alike to the conscience and the reason of mankind. They can not be changed by new engines of destruction. Let them be violated or infringed, and throughout the world there is vigorous condemnation of the guilty. Normal acts of war, which involve the killing of thousands upon thousands of men, the maiming of thousands of others, and the imposition of terrible hardships upon noncombatants in the field of operations, produce sympathy and charity for the sufferers — nothing more. But to burn a town like Louvain, with its university, its cathedral, and its priceless library; to damage works of art like the cathedrals of Rheims and Soisson; to drop bombs from aircraft upon populous communities; to shoot a nurse like Miss Cavell; to sink a liner and destroy the lives of innocent men, women and children — such occurrences provoke an outburst of indignation not only in the bellig-

erent countries injured, but in those countries free from war. It is an honor to humanity that this is true; and that it is true is due to the growth of the public conscience everywhere. No sign of the advancing times is clearer than this: That there exists in every land a national sensitiveness to international opinion. This has been shown by the rapidity with which a defense is offered to a charged breach of the laws of war.

Against the use of the submarine, the aeroplane or any other "humane" weapon of destruction in strictly military operation and in accordance with what have come to be regarded as the customary laws of war, there has been and can be no complaint. But when these agencies are employed in violation of the recognized rights of the belligerent against which they are directed, and particularly in violation of the obligations the employing state is under to neutrals, wrongs are perpetrated for which redress properly can be exacted, and measures taken to

insure against their recurrence. The rights of belligerents are described in the Hague Convention, and these include exemption from the employment of force in so far as it would constitute an act of barbarity or treachery. There may be some shadow of excuse for the violation of each other's rights by belligerents. The anger and bitterness war provokes, the brutality it produces, necessarily mitigate the judgment humanity renders. But there can be no excuse for acts committed in pursuance of a deliberate policy, acts which strike at the lives of neutrals and other noncombatants as well as at belligerents.

Such a policy was inaugurated by Germany in her under-seas campaign. That policy was an expression of the terrible German doctrine of *Kriegsraison*, that is to say, that in war the end justifies the means. Deprived of the command of the sea by the powerful British fleet, and fearful of the throttling effect British maritime operations would have upon the Central Powers, Germany resorted to the

use of the submarine against all merchantmen trading with the Allies. Her Naval General Staff, of which Admiral von Tirpitz was the head, believed the inhabitants of the British Isles could be terrorized and made to feel the pinch of starvation, and that an internal situation would develop which would be helpful to the German cause.

Following the outbreak of the war, floating mines, lurking terrors of the deep, were set adrift. Each belligerent charged the other with committing this crime against humanity and international law. In this connection it may be pointed out that at the second Hague Convention, the German delegation defeated an English proposal estopping belligerents from laying mines in the open sea. The British government charged, moreover, that the mines Germany had planted were not in accordance with the requirements of the Hague provisions which were adopted. Irrespective of the truth or falsity of this charge, it is certain that steamers were

blown up. The United States made no investigation and no protest, a course which, as a powerful neutral entitled to navigate the seas in absolute safety, it is apparent it should have followed. The Trent case is in point in this connection. From this British steamer, Confederate agents were removed by an American man-of-war. France as well as Great Britain protested against the action of the American naval officer on the ground that the rights of all neutral nations, as well as the specific rights of Great Britain, had been violated.

The effect of Germany's action, or at least the charge made against her, was to cause the British government to declare the North Sea "within the military zone," and to notify neutral shipping that if any other than a prescribed route were followed, vessels would move "at their own peril."

While avowedly acting in the interest of the safety of merchant ships, it is manifest the British government went beyond

its power in describing the North Sea as a "military zone." The United States, whose rights, in common with those of other neutrals, were violated, again refrained from protesting. Its silence was construed by Germany as acquiescence in an unlawful condition, as proof of subservience of its neutral rights to the needs of the Allies.

Germany, although using neutral flags herself, complained of the systematic use of neutral flags by British merchantmen—the case of the *Lusitania*, which hoisted the American colors in February, 1915, is cited, because it led to a protest by the United States. Germany was angered, too, by the refusal of Great Britain and her Allies to respect the Declaration of London, which had been signed by British delegates but not ratified by the British parliament nor by any other government; by the alleged unlawful extension by the Allies of the list of absolute contraband goods; and by the measures taken by European neutrals to stop trade

with Germany as demanded by the London government.

These various grounds were set forth by Germany as justification for the submarine campaign against merchantmen for which she had been sedulously preparing. The German Admiralty issued a proclamation on February 4, 1915, describing the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, as a "war zone." Beginning February 18, it was announced that every enemy merchant ship found in the "war zone" would be destroyed, without its being "always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crew and passengers on that account." It was added that "even neutral ships are exposed to danger in the war zone, as in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered January 31 by the British Government and of the accidents of naval war, it can not always be avoided to strike even neutral ships in attacks that are directed at enemy ships." A memorandum conveyed to neutral governments

an explanation of the reasons avowedly animating the German government. "Great Britain," said this memorandum, "invokes the vital interests of the British Empire which are at stake in justification of its violations of the law of nations, and the neutral powers appear to be satisfied with theoretical protests, thus actually admitting the vital interests of a belligerent as a sufficient excuse for methods of waging war of whatever description. The time has come for Germany also to invoke such vital interests."

One of the "theoretical protests" to which Germany referred was a note sent December 26, 1914, by Secretary of State Bryan to the British government through Ambassador Page, in London. In this communication the United States protested against the seizure and detention of American cargoes. Our attitude induced no modification of the British policy, which later, indeed, was made more rigid and effective.

The German "war zone" proclamation

produced a feeling of irritation in the United States because it constituted an assertion of belligerent rights over the open seas. Recognition of its propriety and legality would have meant that a belligerent could declare the entire Atlantic, even up to the three-mile limit of the United States, as a "war zone." Further, it was realized the Germans had advanced the claim to sink on sight any merchant ship that came within the range of a submarine torpedo, without making provision in accordance with the solemn dictates of humanity, for the safety of passengers and crew. They had declared their purpose not to observe the laws and customs of war, among which are those of visit and search of all ships overhauled, and the destruction of prizes only in extraordinary circumstances, such as danger to the safety of the captor or to the success of the operations in which the latter is engaged at the time.

They had determined to employ in this kind of warfare, submarines, which by their very character could not observe the

principles of humanity and international law; which could not perform visit and search without danger to their own safety; which could not take captures which they made within the jurisdiction of a prize court, and which could not provide accommodations for the passengers and crews of large merchant ships. Of particular importance to the United States was the fact that the German "war zone" proclamation was in direct violation of Article XII of the Treaty of 1785 with Prussia — a treaty made by direction of the Great Frederick and signed by Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. That treaty specifically recognized our freedom of navigation in the waters of an enemy of Germany.

Prior to the issuance of the German "war zone" proclamation, the German auxiliary cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, on January 27, 1915, captured the American schooner *William P. Frye*, in the South Atlantic. This vessel was laden with a cargo of wheat consigned "to order" for

delivery at Queenstown, Falmouth or Plymouth. The *Frye* was destroyed, in spite of the position taken by the German government that wheat or other foodstuffs consigned to the German civilian population, should be exempt from seizure or destruction, under the Declaration of London and the principles of international law upon which that document was based, and also in violation of the express stipulation of the treaty of the Great Frederick. Moreover, as the crew of the schooner was taken aboard the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, which was liable to destruction if overhauled by a British man-of-war, it could not be claimed these American citizens had been put "in a place of safety" within the meaning of international law.

The case of the *Frye* necessarily did not come up for consideration between the two governments until news of her destruction reached the United States almost a month later. Then the negotiations dragged along for a year, with a promise of adjustment of the amount of indemnity

to be paid by Germany. The case is referred to here merely to show that Germany countenanced the very things she complained of against England, with the additional failure to make proper provision for the safety of the crew of the *Frye*. Berlin's defense of the action of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was that the *Frye* was en route to one of several fortified ports, which serve as bases for the British fleet, and that the cargo therefore was in reality destined for the armed forces of the enemy. Even this contention, however, crumbles in the light of the treaty of 1785.

A consideration of all the facts leading up to the German "war zone" proclamation as well as the terms of the proclamation itself, caused President Wilson and his cabinet to formulate a note, cabled to the German government under date of February 10, 1915. This note pointed to the critical situation which might arise in the relations of the United States and Germany, were the German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed

in the Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessels of the United States or cause the death of American citizens. It described the limitations applicable to belligerent maritime operations, denied that the conduct of the United States justified any imputations upon its neutrality, and closed:

“If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily existing between the two Governments.

“If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German

Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property, and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

Did this semi-ultimatum stop Germany's submarine campaign? The world knows it did not. On March 28, 1915, a submarine torpedoed the British liner *Falaba*, and among those drowned as a result was an American citizen. On April 28, the American vessel *Cushing* was attacked in the English Channel by a German aeroplane. On May 1, the American vessel *Gulflight* was attacked by a German submarine, and two or more Americans lost their lives. On May 7, the British liner *Lusitania* was torpedoed, and of the 1,256

men, women and children drowned, 115 were of American nationality.

Intense indignation swept over the country when the fate of the *Lusitania* became known. What did the government at Washington propose to do to hold Germany to that "strict accountability" promised in the note of February 10? President Wilson, a few days after the destruction of this vessel, delivered an address in Philadelphia in which he used the expression "too proud to fight." It was insisted at the White House the following morning that this expression had no relation to the attitude of the government with reference to the *Lusitania* outrage, and action was forecasted which, it was asserted, would appease the wrath of the people. Prior to this declaration appeared a statement from Colonel Roosevelt, denouncing the attack upon the *Lusitania* and demanding instant measures to obtain redress and put an end to so barbarous a method of warfare. The importance of that statement cannot be overestimated; for it forced

the administration to realize that something must be done and done quickly.

The negotiations with reference to the *Lusitania* and the long list of liners and merchantmen that followed her to the bottom of the sea, are now history. In their early stages President Wilson proclaimed sound principles, appealing alike to the humanitarian and the international law authority. He made polite but firm demands upon Germany, and peremptory demands upon Austria-Hungary, when that nation began her submarine campaign in the Mediterranean. In September, 1915, he obtained assurances from Germany that liners plying in the "war zone" about the British Isles would not be sunk without warning, unless they resisted or attempted to escape, and in January, 1916, he obtained like assurances with respect to all merchantmen plying in the Mediterranean. In the case only of the British liner *Arabic* did he receive a "disavowal," and that in the form of a personal letter from Count von Bernstorff to the Honor-

able Robert Lansing, who had succeeded Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State, not as an official declaration by the German government to the American government! The solution of the *Lusitania* question which finally was determined upon but which was not adopted because of the return of Germany to her "sink on sight" policy, was predicated upon the admission, rather the reiteration, by Berlin (recall the German memorandum establishing a "war zone" about the British Isles), of the view that the sinking of the liner was an act of retaliation, which Germany justifies and which the United States holds to be illegal; and that insofar as American citizens were drowned the German government was liable. Austria-Hungary punished the submarine commander who shelled and sank the Italian liner *Ancona*, while defending his action. Not a dollar of indemnity has been paid, though promised. As a matter of fact, the curse of this whole wretched business lies in the action of the government of the United

States in placing American lives upon a monetary basis.

Are neutral and noncombatant lives safer at sea as a result of the diplomacy of Washington? Germany and Austria-Hungary have not abandoned their submarine warfare; they have not agreed to live up to the spirit of the principles of humanity and international law. It is of first importance that passengers and crew shall be transferred to "a place of safety" before the vessel they are aboard be sunk. Germany promised in January, 1916, that all persons should be "accorded safety." Austro-Hungary about the same time declared that vessels "may" not be destroyed without the persons on board "being brought into safety." In a prior note relating to the *Frye*, Germany explained her pledge of safety by stating that persons found on board a vessel "may" not be ordered into lifeboats, except when the general conditions — that is, the weather, the state of the sea, and the neighborhood of the coasts — afford

absolute certainty that the boats would reach the nearest port. A condition of sea and weather and distance from the coast may mean one thing to a submarine commander and a totally different thing to delicate men, women and children, unable to prepare themselves for the ordeal thrust upon them. The Austro-Hungarian pledge was by no means final, as indicated by the reservation of the right accompanying it to bring up at a later period "the difficult questions of international law connected with submarine warfare." It should be observed further that Germany did not abandon her "war zone" about the British Isles, liners only being assured of security.

What little the United States obtained was taken away, and submarine warfare with all its horrors restored, as desired by the Central Powers, at the instance of the United States itself. On January 18, 1916, Secretary Lansing suggested to the Allies that merchantmen should be deprived of guns for defensive purposes in order that

they might not attack submarines, and declared that President Wilson was considering the advisability of treating merchantmen so armed as auxiliary cruisers. From the foundation of the Republic, the United States has recognized the right of merchantmen to arm for defense. This right was solemnly upheld against the intention of his government by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of the *Nereide* and has been a feature of our maritime law. To surrender it is to place a ship at the mercy of a brutal commander, as was the *Ancona*, which, while stopping, was shelled and some of her passengers and crew killed. By treating merchantmen armed purely for defense, as auxiliary cruisers, submarines thereby gain the right to sink them without warning and without consideration of the innocent life on board. Germany promptly took advantage of the position of the United States and announced that from March 1, 1916, all vessels carrying guns would be regarded as lawful war prey and torpedoed on sight.

Mr. Lansing's suggested change of the rules of war while the war is in progress was deeply resented by the Allies, who indicated their objections to any such action. Thereupon President Wilson resumed the view that merchantmen could be armed for defensive purposes. Congress and the country evidenced division upon the question, and a legislative crisis occurred over a proposal to warn Americans against traveling in belligerent armed ships. Fortunately, this proposal was lost.

German diplomacy, it is apparent, has won substantial victories, and Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States, deserve, in large measure, the credit therefor. Crises were bridged over at critical moments for their country. At the time the *Lusitania* question was at a white heat, the Balkan situation was reaching a climax. Bulgaria was on the eve of entrance into the war, and Greece and Roumania seemed to be hesitating as to the side upon which

to cast their fortunes. Germany realized the tremendous moral effect upon those nations a rupture with the United States would produce. She devoted herself to the task of preserving relations with the American government; and it was the less difficult for her to do this because of the terrible havoc wrought among her submarines by the well calculated operations of the British fleet. What effect the representations of the United States had, therefore, was indirect rather than direct.

As a matter of fact, the disposition in Berlin and Vienna has been to discount American demands. It was not forgotten that before Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan entered into power, they declared that while they were connected with the government there would be no war. In the foreign view this was a confession of purpose to avoid trouble whatever circumstances might arise. Then the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Dr. Dumba, interpreted a statement of Mr. Bryan in connection with the *Lusitania* note, as evidence that the President was

acting to satisfy American sentiment rather than to enforce American rights. Again, Mr. Bryan, the man who made Mr. Wilson president, resigned from the cabinet because of his expressed belief that the course of the Chief Executive would lead to war, which he said he intended to prevent by the exercise of his influence as a private citizen. Thus was apparent to foreign nations a sharp division in the councils of the party in power. This division was made the more striking (the seriousness of the matter justifies repetition) by the action of Democratic senators and members of the House in advocating legislation prohibiting Americans from traveling on belligerent merchant ships; though this right had been maintained by their government from its independence to the present day.

What other course could the United States have pursued than that which it actually followed? How could it have done differently and still have kept out of the war? This resembles a discussion of

the old question of locking the stable door after the horse had disappeared. Nevertheless, it may be said that from the beginning Germany has not believed the United States really intended to back up its demands. Not only did she know we lacked the armed force with which to support our representations, but she believed we would have a revolution if we pushed her too far; she believed we were so involved in the Mexican imbroglio that we feared to precipitate a clash with another nation, and she believed we were impressed with the danger of war with Japan, and that this would influence us to observe a policy of hesitation. In short, she relied upon our timidity, our internal differences, and the division in the party in power, to prevent us from proceeding to extremes, and therefore she felt assured of that freedom of operation which she enjoyed for so many fevered months. Had the United States fully realized what the "strict accountability" note meant and was determined to enforce it, or, rather, had Germany believed the United States

would compel respect for the principles laid down in that admirable document, it is exceedingly doubtful if the *Lusitania* would have been destroyed or, if she had been torpedoed, that the distressing outrages which followed would have occurred.

Drowned, one hundred and forty-eight American men, women and children. That is the price we paid for the first year of the German submarine campaign!

CHAPTER IX

THE WAR AND AMERICAN DOLLARS

Trade is life. A belligerent deprived of necessities from other markets is brought to his knees, unless a decision can be had on land, as in the Austro-Prussian, the Franco-Prussian and other wars of a like character. Napoleon's brilliant victories were made futile by British command of the sea. The Confederacy was starved into submission by the blockade established and maintained by the Union. Germany has been uniformly successful in the land operations of the present war. Yet she is struggling, as no other nation ever before has struggled, to avert the weakness which the suppression of her trade with other states inevitably will produce.

One of the reasons for the rage of Germany at Great Britain for entering the war, was the realization of the strangling

effect of sea power. To meet that danger, Germany endeavored to bring home the threat of starvation to the British people and thus force them to make peace. She relied upon her submarines to accomplish this purpose, but the activity of the British fleet soon demonstrated that this reliance was vain. Then she applied her wonderful organizing powers to the conservation of the necessities of life and the intensive expansion of her crops, and above all to their distribution so that all should be fed. Her blows through the Balkans, which resulted in the crushing of Servia and Montenegro, were inspired in part by her need of obtaining food supplies from Turkey and Bulgaria.

In the meantime, there were slowly tightening about her the invisible coils of the Allied fleets. Her commerce, as well as that of the nations fighting with her, became greatly reduced from what it was prior to the war. Yet it has not been destroyed, largely because of the activities of neutral traders. Where there is a

demand, a determined effort always will be made to provide the supply. In the case of Germany there are no physical difficulties in the way. Surveyors' lines are the only boundaries between her and Holland and Denmark, and a short strip of sea furnishes easy access to and from Sweden, which is contiguous to Norway. Modern means of handling and transportation have made Dutch and Danish ports as convenient for German trade, so far as geographical conditions are concerned, as the German ports of Hamburg and Bremen.

There are certain specified belligerent rights recognized by international law, certain neutral rights which likewise are recognized by international law, and a twilight zone between, where controversy flourishes. A belligerent has the right to seize and confiscate absolute contraband, that is, articles solely or primarily useful in war, destined for his enemy's territory. He has the right to seize and confiscate conditional contraband, that is, articles

useful for peace as well as war, destined for his enemy's territory, if intended for the use of the armed forces or the government of the enemy state. He has the right to institute a blockade of his enemy's ports and coasts and thereby prevent commercial intercourse of all kind. He has the right to visit and search all neutral ships upon the high seas, to take such ships into port on evidence of the illegitimacy of their conduct, and to condemn the cargoes they carry if the noxious character of the voyage and cargo shall be established, and even the ship itself under a recent practice recognized by the Declaration of London. This practice is not, however, law so far as the United States and Great Britain are concerned.

The neutral, on the other hand, has the right to trade freely in non-contraband with belligerent territory, unless that territory shall be blockaded; and, indeed, subject to the danger of seizure and confiscation, he has the right to trade in contraband or anything he sees fit. As peace and not

war is the normal relation of nations, he has the right to free intercourse with others not party to the conflict, and if his trade should be interfered with, such interference must be limited to the imperative necessity of the belligerents, and then only to the extent that it is a necessity. He has the right to insist that evidence and not mere suspicion shall be the ground for seizures of ships and cargoes, and that the burden of proof shall rest upon the captor; such proof to be the evidence derived from the ship at the time of seizure. He has a right in connection with all seizures to full hearing by a prize court and a judgment in accordance with international law, not in accordance with domestic or municipal law. He has a right to disregard a blockade which is not formally proclaimed and not effectively maintained; and to refuse to be bound in any way thereby.

He has a right to insist upon the division of all articles into three classes: absolute contraband, conditional contraband and non-contraband. Under the first must be

included only those articles which are susceptible of use for war purposes; under the second, those which may be susceptible of such use or which are consigned directly to the enemy forces or the enemy government; under the third, those which are incapable of use for war purposes. Further, the neutral has the right to belligerent respect of the principle that a ship shall not be sunk save under extraordinary conditions, such as imminent danger to her captor or to the success of the operations in which the latter is engaged; and in this exceptional contingency, provision must be made for the safety of the passengers and crew.

There is hardly a belligerent right which has not been illegally extended during the operations of the present war, scarcely a neutral right which has not been violated or infringed. By virtue of the fact that conditions had made it the "Great Neutral," the United States became the chief protestant against unlawful conduct on the part of belligerents, and the prin-

cial champion of the rights of neutrals. We know that German and Austro-Hungarian submarines tore great gaps in the fabric of international law, and that in defiance of solemn dictates of humanity they willfully drowned hundreds of non-combatants, including American citizens. We know that all belligerents have extended their lists of absolute contraband, such extension being based rather upon their own views as to the other's necessities as well as their own, than upon any regard for neutral rights.

We know that by her decree of February 4, 1915, Germany sought to establish a "blockade" of the British Isles without the effective force to maintain it and without respecting, without indeed intending to respect, the fundamental principles of humanity and international law. Great Britain retaliated by Orders in Council of March 11, 1915, which were open to criticism not so much for their failure to conform to the technical requirements of international law as for their application to

German commerce passing through neutral ports. The latter was justified by the extension of the doctrine of "continuous voyage" to contraband goods consigned to neutral ports when their destination was believed to be enemy territory. It does not or should not, apply to goods of enemy origin issuing from neutral ports.

The United States, in common with European neutrals, protested against the Orders in Council and a similar French decree, declaring the measures appeared to menace the rights of trade and intercourse of neutral nations, not only with belligerent powers but with one another, and that they constituted a "practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce with the whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of nations now at peace." Moreover, the United States claimed that the measures of the Allies were partial in their application, since they had no relation to Scandinavian ports and therefore did not fall, as required, with

equal severity upon the commerce of all neutrals.

As a matter of fact, what the Allies endeavored to do was to enforce a blockade against Germany, minus the heavy penalties visited for violation of a proclaimed blockade. They delayed the date of the enforcement of the Orders in Council, they permitted the exportation of particular products indispensable to the conduct of certain American industries, they bound themselves to inflict no loss on owners save in the case of contraband. It is evident from a study of the British notes that a sincere desire underlay the British and French policy to interfere as little as possible with legitimate neutral trade and to reduce to a minimum the inconveniences and hardships which enforcement of the measures of those governments inevitably inflicted. It is worthy of remark in this connection that as a result of British and French activities, not a single innocent life has been lost, and there has been no destruction of a

single neutral vessel or property of any kind without due process of law.

Great Britain contends, and her contention has been ably presented by her Ambassador to the United States, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, that her course is in consonance with the spirit if not the letter of international law, and with reference to the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage, that it is in accordance with the practice of the Union during the Civil War. It is quite true that throughout that conflict the Washington government maintained the legality of its right to suppress the over-sea trade of the Confederacy, not only directly through a blockade, which in its early stages was extremely tenuous and hardly binding, but indirectly through the seizure of goods en route to neutral ports whence they were to be transhipped and forwarded to the South. Substantially, this is the policy of the Allies; but the operations are necessarily of greater magnitude to-day because of the tremendous growth in commerce. Cargoes were

condemned for violating the Union blockade; those seized by the Allies have been paid for or restored. The precedents established by our own courts have been cited by the Allies in justification for their procedure, and it must be admitted that those precedents frequently embarrass us in our efforts to assert neutral rights.

The truth is, the present war has demonstrated the irreconcilable character of the conflict between belligerent and neutral rights. It is impossible for a belligerent to intercept the trade of his enemy without restricting the freedom of a neutral, and it is impossible for a neutral to enjoy freedom of trade without striking at the interests of a belligerent. There can be, of course, no question as to the legitimacy of a blockade. It has been recognized by the publicists of every state, and it has been enforced by our own government. Austria-Hungary proclaimed a blockade against Montenegro in the early days of the war, and the neutrals accepted it. There is no ground either in international

law or practice for Germany's denunciation of a blockade as cruel and inhuman. Its purpose is to compel the surrender of the enemy by cutting off the supplies of the civilian population. It was the widespread want and suffering of the South that brought the Confederacy to Appomattox. But until Great Britain proclaims a formal blockade, until she lives up to the established principles of international law governing interference with enemy trade, neutrals not only have the right but it is their duty to refuse to respect her procedure.

To obviate the development of such questions as have arisen, the United States on the outbreak of the war sought to induce all the belligerents to observe the principles of the Declaration of London, an instrument in treaty form which had been negotiated and signed by representatives of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy and Japan, now fighting as the Allies, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain and the Netherlands. This Declaration failed

of ratification, in spite of the fact that the rules it set forth conformed in substance with the generally recognized practices of international law. The Allies declined to be bound unqualifiedly by the Declaration, though the Central Powers were willing to abide by it. The war has seen this excellent work of able men fail to stand the test of practice. The blockade provision has been disregarded; the difference between absolute, conditional and non-contraband has been practically wiped out, and neutral vessels have been destroyed under peculiarly horrible conditions. There has remained nothing for the neutral governments to do but to base their protests upon international law as recognized prior to the beginning of the war.

There are other acts of the Allies, besides interference with legitimate trade between ourselves and other neutrals and the seizure on mere suspicion and undue detention of ships and cargoes, justly deserving of American complaint. Our mails have been interfered with, our com-

mercial messages interrupted, and persons have been taken from our ships. The censorship of the mails is supported by the argument that they serve as a channel for the conveyance of contraband and enemy information. The censorship of commercial messages is based upon the possibility that they may contain enemy information. There can be no justification for the removal of members of a crew or of passengers from an American ship; and in every case that has arisen, such persons, upon demand, have been released. This government, likewise, is justified in objecting emphatically to interference with or supervision over our commercial activities when such activities have no relation to war operations.

It is of course incumbent upon a nation to insist upon respect for its rights. It must do so as strenuously in times of prosperity as in times of adversity. Necessarily there is a languid public interest in what the government may do during the former period, and an aroused and excited

public interest during the latter. For several years before the great war began, the American people were afflicted with hard times. Though they always had prided themselves upon their economic independence, they suffered during the first two weeks following the declaration of war an almost total paralysis of their over-seas commerce. Sterling exchange on London rose to unprecedented heights, the stock and other business exchanges were forced to close, and a large number of commercial failures took place. Nothing could have more clearly demonstrated our economic interdependence with the rest of the world.

Fortunately we emerged from that terrific financial strain without being compelled to resort to moratoriums and other measures which were adopted abroad. As time passed, and the necessities of belligerents forced them to turn to us for supplies, an era of prosperity was inaugurated. From a commercially provincial and secondary power we leaped

in the course of a year to a rank of first importance among the great nations of the world — economically, industrially and financially. Our international position has changed from that of a debtor to that of a creditor country. Our exports were valued at a billion dollars more during the calendar year 1915 than ever before in our history — this in spite of the fact that we were cut off from trade with Germany, Austria-Hungaria, Bulgaria and Turkey. Our imports, with the exception of gold, naturally were below those of times of peace. To meet their obligations in part, belligerents shipped us large quantities of gold.

The United States now has the promise of becoming the world's greatest banker. In order to facilitate trade, credit loans amounting to hundreds of millions were negotiated by foreign governments with American financial houses. There is not the slightest objection in international law to the making of loans by private individuals to a belligerent; yet determined

pressure was applied to the administration to proclaim such a prohibition, happily without effect. Likewise pressure was exerted to obtain an embargo on munitions of war, an act which not only would seriously affect American industries, but would be tantamount to the adoption of a policy of unneutrality toward the Allies. It is evident that an embargo on munitions, in order to be effective, would have to be complemented by an embargo on all the products entering into such munitions. In other words, there would have to be a prohibition of exports of cotton, which is a base for high explosives, steel, etc. To refuse to sell munitions to the Allies would be to change the rules of war while the war is in progress; and unquestionably this would precipitate a crisis in our relations with Great Britain, Russia and France. That our position is sound is shown by the fact that both Germany and Austria-Hungary while at peace have sold to belligerents. It follows that a general embargo likewise would be regarded by

the Allies as an act of unneutrality, besides being extremely harmful to the American people.

Thus, in spite of the restrictions which have been placed upon neutral commerce, the war has been highly beneficial to the American people. We are now enjoying obvious advantages which will disappear when the treaty of peace shall be signed. It is important that our government in its foreign policies shall insist upon the maintenance of neutral rights, and it is likewise necessary that our business men shall prepare for the conditions following the war, conditions which will involve sharper competition, better organization of industry and an energy the greater because of the spur of necessity.

Trade of the United States with the world:

Fiscal year 1913-14. . . . \$4,258,504,805

Fiscal year 1914-15. . . . \$4,442,759,080

CHAPTER X

WHERE WE STAND WITH THE ALLIES

The great moving factors in the relations of states are self-interest and sentiment. The latter is influential and sometimes seems paramount; but careful inquiry always discloses that its development and expression impinge on self-interest. Pre-revolutionary France furnished aid to the American rebels against England, not because the French monarchy looked with favor upon democracy, but because of hatred of England and a desire to weaken and thus contest the latter's maritime supremacy. In spite of the powerful assistance received from France, and of the continued feeling against Great Britain, President Washington declined to pursue any other policy than that of strict neutrality in the war between those countries, a policy adhered to by his immediate succes-

sors. The Mexican War was precipitated by our annexation of Texas. The Civil War was the direct result of the controversy over slaves as property. The war with Spain was an emotional expression by the American people, but nevertheless had important underlying economic and strategical causes.

But our history also discloses an intense pro-French sentiment in the days of Washington, an intense pro-Texan sentiment preliminary to our war with Mexico, an intense abolition sentiment in the North prior to the Civil War, and an intense sentiment for "Free Cuba" during the Cleveland and McKinley administrations. In foreign wars, our people always have taken sides as in the war between Russia and Japan when sympathy went out to the latter as the "under dog." In that in which the world is involved to-day, our sympathy unquestionably is on the side of the Allies, largely because of the German invasion of Belgium and the operations of German submarines.

What is true of the United States, necessarily is true of other nations. Each has its own interests, its own culture, its own aspirations. Because humanity is what it is, each reaches out to advance its own interests and its own aspirations and to spread its own culture. Clashes follow, usually of a character, in the present spirit of civilization, to permit an adjustment. When so-called "vital interests" or questions of "honor" or "territory" are involved, war takes place.

It therefore behooves us, in considering the relations of the United States and the powers which began the war under the popular designation of "The Allies," to examine the basic ideals and basic interests of each country and establish where they conflict, if at all. The United States has a passion for individual liberty and individual development. So have Great Britain and France. The United States insists on popular government. So do Great Britain and France. The United States requires respect for the rights of

property. So do Great Britain and France. In short, it is the people in each of these three countries who manage their own affairs and whose ideals their governments endeavor to express and whose interests their governments endeavor to expand and protect. Italy's civilization is different from that of the United States and Great Britain and rather resembles that of France. It is founded on Latin traditions, on Latin culture. The anachronisms in the Allied combination are Russia, Japan, Servia and Montenegro. Russia is an autocracy. Japan is a democracy springing from feudalism. Servia and Montenegro, sturdy in their mountain independence, are feudal.

The United States has no desire to extend its territorial dominions; indeed is disposed to surrender the Philippine Archipelago. Prior to the war, Great Britain was equally content territorially; but events of the war have placed German colonies in Britain's possession, and she is likely to retain some of them, particu-

larly those sections of Africa which will enable the realization of Cecil Rhodes' dream of a Cape-to-Cairo Railroad through British-owned land. France had become reconciled to the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, but if she should be victor in the present struggle, she will demand their return and will extend her boundaries and control at German expense in north Africa. Russia expects to obtain an outlet on the Mediterranean — this may be productive of a war with Great Britain when that now raging is ended — is fanatically inspired by the doctrine of Pan-Slavism, and is covetous of North China. Japan aspires to the mastery of the Pacific and the Far East and intends to enforce the policy of "Asia for the Asiatics." Devastated Servia hopes for the restoration of her one-time greatness. Montenegro, now in irons, looks for extended boundaries.

There is no conflict territorially between the United States and any of the Allies, with the exception of Russia and Japan with reference to China; and there

is no American who would consider for a moment the idea of fighting over the question of Chinese integrity. The rearrangement of European and African territory, with the sole exception of Liberia in the Dark Continent, is not a matter of American concern; though we unquestionably would give our moral support to the program Sir Edward Grey, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, outlined to the author: Restoration of Belgium to the Belgian people, acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine by France, and a decision by each of the small peoples of the Old World as to the country to which it desires to attach itself, or to work out its own destiny as an independent state. In the fate of the German Pacific Islands we are more deeply interested. We also are watchful over China's destiny, largely because it is important for us commercially that the integrity of that country should be maintained.

The war with Spain marked a new epoch in the life of the American nation. Prior

thereto we had been a potential world power. Thereafter we became in fact a recognized member of the world's council of Great Nations. We took part in the international expedition which rescued the beleaguered Legations in Peking and suppressed the Boxer revolt; we brought about the adoption by all the powers of the Hay principles of the integrity of China and the Open Door in that country; we exerted our good offices and served as mediator in the Russo-Japanese war; we filled a like role in effecting the settlement of the Moroccan dispute, which threatened a European conflict; we substituted the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty for the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and, freed from the obligation of joint action with the British government, we acquired the Panama Canal Zone and constructed the Panama Canal; we forced arbitration of the claims of Great Britain, Germany and Italy against Venezuela, after those countries had attempted to collect by force; we were a leader in The Hague Peace Conferences,

and in the negotiation of treaties of arbitration; we began an active commercial campaign, which resulted in our foreign commerce jumping from \$1,850,000,000 in 1898 to \$4,258,000,000 in 1914.

In the various things we did, our ideal was peace, our interest the extension of our trade. Nor were we selfish in connection with the latter effort. We had no desire for exclusive markets. We were willing to meet competition, provided it was on equal terms. Therefore, we became the exponent of the commercial "open door" everywhere.

This also was the policy of Great Britain. The government of that empire gave powerful assistance to the Hay proposals relative to the integrity of, and equality of opportunity in, China. It seconded our efforts to induce Japan to make peace, just as the German Emperor seconded our efforts to bring Russia to Portsmouth. It welcomed our peaceful intervention in the Moroccan controversy. As a concession to the United States, it agreed to waive its

right to cooperate with us in the construction of the Trans-Isthmian Canal. Public opinion in England did not sustain the government in the Venezuelan adventure with Germany and Italy, and it acquiesced gladly in the Roosevelt demand for arbitration of the claims against that South American republic. It negotiated a treaty of arbitration with us in 1908, whereby all disputes of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties, must be referred to arbitration at The Hague, provided they do not involve the honor, vital interests or territory of either nation, and subsequently it signed a Bryan Treaty for the investigation of all disputes, whatever their character. Similar engagements have been made by the United States with France and Italy. Japan signed an arbitration treaty in 1908; Russia did not. Russia signed a Bryan treaty; Japan refused to do so.

Russia, and France as her ally, was reluctant to adhere to the Hay proposals regarding China. Finally they were

brought into line. Japan, realizing the importance to her ultimate aim of a world declaration in regard to the maintenance of Chinese integrity, promptly announced her support of the American doctrine. Italy, deprived by American intervention of Chinese territory, did likewise. When Secretary Hay was felicitated upon his achievement and told that he had written a new and indelible world policy, he remarked: "You don't recall American history. Ten years from now this will be relegated to the storeroom of discarded policies." Mr. Hay's prediction was based upon his realization of the lack of a continuous foreign policy by his country, and had no relation to the sincerity of his belief that what he had accomplished was in the real interest of the American people.

The policies of all European countries have caused them sedulously to cultivate the United States. That of Great Britain has been marked, especially since the Civil War, by a keen desire to remove all questions of dispute from her relations with us.

She has made billions of investment in this country, and desires us prosperous in order that we shall be able to pay the interest thereon. She arranged the Alabama claims, growing out of the operation of the Confederate cruiser during the Civil War, the Behring fur-seal, the Fisheries and the Alaskan boundary questions, in a manner satisfactory to the United States. She swallowed her pride when she agreed to President Cleveland's ultimatum in connection with the boundary of Venezuela. One of the most fruitful causes of the hundred years' peace between the United States and Great Britain is the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1818, requiring disarmament upon the Great Lakes; and an additional cause for continued peace lies in the Root-Bryce treaties of 1909, under which all pending Canadian controversies were settled, and provision made for the arbitration of future controversies.

There are other mutual interests which make for friendly relations between the United States and Great Britain. It is

evident that the Monroe Doctrine is invaluable to the British Empire. Under that Doctrine, the United States will not permit British territory in this hemisphere to be acquired by another government. This likewise is true of French territory. It may well be said that the Monroe Doctrine is a close bond between the United States and Great Britain and France. Another matter of economic importance is that the United States and the British Pacific Dominions have the same objection to the invasion of their territories by the Mongolian races. It was likewise to the interest of Great Britain that Germany's sway over Pacific islands should not be extended; nevertheless, deep gratitude was evoked in the United States by the action of the British Naval Commander in notifying the German Admiral in Manila Bay that he would join Commodore Dewey in resisting attack upon the American squadron. Nor should the American people lose sight of the forbearance Great Britain has displayed in connection with Mexico. British

subjects have been murdered, British interests have been destroyed and injured. Yet the London government, prior to the war, steadily refused to listen to suggestions that Europe restore peace and order, in spite of the United States.

France's adventures in the American hemisphere really ended when the United States assembled troops on the Mexican boundary and ordered Napoleon the Little to withdraw from Mexico. Before the war with Spain, France took part in negotiations looking to the creation of a foreign combination to compel the United States to remain at peace. Lord Pauncefote, the British Ambassador, informed President McKinley of what was going on; and the negotiations became abortive. The real inspiration of those negotiations came from Berlin. France has given evidence of every desire for our friendship, but in her foreign policy, particularly in connection with the Far East, she has been handicapped by her alliance with Russia.

Russian statesmen cannot understand the

attitude adopted by the United States. As proof of their friendship and of their desire for American independence and strength, they point to the substantial aid they gave the Union when during the Civil War their government sent warships to New York and San Francisco as a demonstration against European intervention; and to the sale of Alaska. They have found us, on the other hand, combating their moves in the Far East and insulting them, as they regard it, by making representations in behalf of the Jews at Kishnieff and by denouncing the Treaty of 1833 because of Russian refusal to admit American Jews into the empire, and by certain commercial measures which injured Russian trade with this country. Japan sees in the United States one of the prime obstacles in the way of her necessitous policies.

It is interesting now to note what change the war has made in the relations of the United States with the Allied Powers. At the outbreak of the struggle there is no doubt England and France looked with

more or less hope upon the translation into action of American condemnation of the invasion of Belgium. President Wilson's proclamation appealing to Americans to be neutral in thought and deed, shattered this hope. The English and French people were grateful for the charity we offered, but they wanted more than charity; they wanted help. There was general approval of our "strict accountability" note to Germany, and when the *Lusitania* was destroyed, there was an expectation that we would hold Germany to a complete responsibility. President Wilson's "too proud to fight" speech was made at this juncture, and its effect upon English and French public opinion was to arouse contempt for Americans. The peoples of those two countries finally came to the conclusion that the United States would not intervene. A common expression was: "We are fighting for your ideals and your civilization, and you are chasing dollars."

The spectacle of a nation waxing prosperous on the agony of other lands is not

one to promote friendship. Moreover, when that nation insists upon respect for its commercial rights, when it seems to place injury to the latter upon the same plane as destruction of neutral life upon the high seas, it is natural for resentment to develop. On the other hand, the statesmen of England and France realized that the United States was serving, in fact, as a military and commercial base for the Allies; that it was supplying them with foodstuffs, munitions of war, and other materials necessary for the conduct of the war. These men did not want the United States to join in the struggle. They desired it to keep aloof, to be in a position to protect their nationals and their interests in enemy territory, as far as such protection could be accorded by a neutral. From their point of view, it was important that the United States should continue at peace, though they believed it should manifest its sympathy by withholding protests against what was conceived to be necessary supervision of ocean commerce.

Advocates of an embargo on munitions of war and even a general commercial embargo, believe such action would assure American peace. Nothing could be more erroneous. If the United States should apply any kind of an embargo, an ugly situation would develop with the Allies. Undoubtedly there would be retaliation. Rubber, wool and other products, which we need, would be withheld. More than this, however, the probability is the Allies would feel that the United States was giving support to the Central Powers, and they would treat us as an enemy. The American people cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that Great Britain deliberately restrained Japan from going too far in 1913 in connection with the California dispute. In case of difficulty with the United States, Great Britain could afford to finance Japan for a war upon us. Further, the fact should not be lost to view that Canada is no mean military antagonist in our state of unpreparedness; and that with the British navy and troops

operating upon our Atlantic seaboard, the Japanese navy and troops operating on our Pacific Slope, and Canada menacing us from the north, we would be in an exceedingly dangerous situation. This contingency is remote, fortunately, and is mentioned only to show that Great Britain is not helpless, whatever the view of those who believe we are free from possibility of successful attack. It is obvious, of course, that such a situation would be brimful of trouble for the Allies, for they would be deprived of our products. Frankly, they do not want it to arise. They prefer to buy of us, to arrange loans with us, to have our friendship not only during the war, but during the time when the negotiations of peace shall be under way.

It may be expected, therefore, that in all things not vital to what the Allies consider the successful prosecution of the war, they will accede to the wishes of the American government. But in those things they regard as vital, the absolute suppression of trade with Germany, for instance, they will

not yield an inch. They have not proclaimed a blockade, because to do so would mean the condemnation of ships and cargoes; they prefer, out of desire to maintain friendly relations with the United States, to pursue an illegal policy which attains the same ends but which permits the compensation of owners of ships and cargoes. But this government cannot acquiesce in such procedure, for to do so would be to give the Central Powers ground for complaining that while we insist upon their living up to the conditions of international law, we refrain from doing so with reference to their enemies.

However serious the dispute that arises with Great Britain or France, or indeed with any of the Allies, the American people may be sure of this: The nations of this combination will exhaust the resources of diplomacy to effect a settlement, and if this be impossible, they will appeal to the treaties providing for investigation and arbitration.

CHAPTER XI

THE CENTRAL POWERS AND AMERICA

Two strikingly inconsistent, even conflicting, policies have been pursued by Germany in her dealings with the United States. On the one hand she has sought to prove her disinterested friendship to the American people, on the other, she has committed acts against their avowed interests. Prior to the war we find her showering honors and courtesies upon the United States and its citizens, and endeavoring earnestly to cultivate close and friendly relations. In glaring contrast therewith was her conduct in seeking to establish coaling bases in the American hemisphere, and especially in the vicinity of the Panama Canal, in displaying an unwonted activity in Brazil, Haiti and later in Mexico, and in pressing her own interests elsewhere at the expense of those of the United States.

Precisely the same conflicting policies have been pursued since the war began. A propaganda was inaugurated at the outbreak of the war designed to gain the sympathy of the United States for the Teutonic cause. Concurrently therewith were deliberate violations of American peace and neutrality within the United States, and violations of our rights upon the high seas. It has been necessary for the Federal Government to take steps to detect and suppress German conspiracies, aimed at the tranquility and safety of the United States; to prosecute German agents guilty of crimes against the laws of the United States, and to dismiss the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador and the military and naval attachés of the German Embassy, because of their connection with plots affecting the sovereignty of the United States.

Is there any deep-rooted national difference between the United States and Germany, which would justify the making of war by one upon the other? We are not

neighbors. It is quite true that in Germany the individual exists for the state, while in the United States the state exists for the individual. Yet to suggest this as a cause of strife is to suggest the ridiculous; for in both countries the right of others to live under the kind of government they desire is recognized as beyond question. We would like to see the republican form of government prevail everywhere; the German government considers the form it maintains to be the one best suited for the needs of a people. Similarly, the United States believes in the excellence of what is known as "Anglo-Saxon" civilization. Germany is equally as ardent in proclaiming the superiority of her own "kultur," and with a commendable missionary spirit has sought to impose its influence upon other countries.

We have benefited tremendously by the mixture of German blood with that which has come to us from other lands. We are under a heavy debt to men of German origin for services rendered both in peace

and war. We have gained a great deal through the adoption of German economic and social principles and methods, and we would gain more by adopting others. The nation would be immensely benefited by patterning after the marvelous economic, industrial, and military organization of the German Empire. Such danger as exists in our relations with Germany, outside of questions arising in connection with the war, is the direct outgrowth of the policy Germany deliberately adopted, and which Dr. Karl Helfferich, at present Imperial German Minister of Finance, described in 1913 as follows:

“With the negotiation of treaties for securing the interests of our commerce and shipping, we have not been, and dare not be, satisfied to stop. Our dependence upon foreign countries, the counterpart to the great advantages derived by us from having taken our place in world-economy, calls for stronger counterpoises. Such a counterpoise can be created by German enter-

prise and German capital establishing a field for their activity beyond the borders of our own country, and thereby gaining a direct influence over foreign territories that may be important to us as sources of supply and as markets. This can be done in an effectual way by acquiring over-sea colonial possessions; for in such a case economic influence is secured and strengthened in the most effective manner possible by political domination. In so far, however, as this way is limited or barred up altogether our end must be reached by means of a far-sighted financial and economic activity."

Here then we have, first, a specific declaration that it is to the interest of Germany to acquire over-seas possessions and, failing in this effort, to observe a far-sighted financial and economic activity. It is unfortunate that in pursuit of the former ambition, the German government deemed it necessary to act in such fashion as to

arouse the suspicion of the United States. With reference to the latter policy, the American believes in a fair field and no favor, so that it has not up to this time aroused any irritation.

The prime motive of Germany during the present war has been to prevent this country from serving as a base for the Allies. It long ago became evident that the Germans, with their hopelessly inferior fleet, could not wrest the command of the seas from the British and French. All they could expect to do on the ocean was to engage in sporadic commerce raiding by surface and under-water craft. After German submarines had been so relentlessly picked off by the British, Berlin came to realize that the results of the war would not be affected by their operations, and that other measures must be adopted. Therefore, efforts were made, through the agencies established before the war, and through propagandists like Dr. Dernburg, former Minister of Colonies, to preach the German cause in the United States,

and to arouse a sentiment which would force either a change of policy by the Administration or legislation by Congress, which would effect the same result.

Germany desired, on the one hand, that the United States should insist upon the right freely to convey foodstuffs and cotton to the civilian population of her empire, and, on the other, to impose an embargo upon the export of munitions of war. She was entirely willing that the United States should apply the doctrine of nonintercourse, realizing that the English people, cut off from wheat supplies from Russia and foodstuffs from the United States, would run the danger of starvation or such grave deprivation that a popular movement for peace would be inaugurated or, at least, the London government hampered in the conduct of the war.

Although the doctrine of nonintercourse has been mooted more or less, it is evident the American people cannot afford to apply it. They tried it once against Great

Britain, and war was preferable to its continuance. To do so again would be to bring to a sudden stop the prosperity the war has given, to disrupt industry and produce a condition of general distress. A trade which mounted to more than five billion dollars for the calendar year 1915, cannot be summarily ended without precipitating a domestic cataclysm.

Great Britain years ago adopted the doctrine that foodstuffs are conditional contraband; that is to say, such products could be seized only if an attempt were made to break through a blockade or if their destination were an enemy state or enemy forces. It is clear such a policy was in the interest of the British people, because of their dependence upon over-seas countries for their supply of food. Likewise it was and is in the interest of the American people, because they produce the wheat, corn and meat which foreign countries require. President Wilson has protested against the British seizure and sale of such articles in English ports, in spite of the

compensation promised or paid to American shippers; but the German government itself has embarrassed our representations by regarding foodstuffs en route to England as contraband and destroying them, and by the organization and distribution of the food supplies available in Germany in order to prevent distress among its population.

The British have advanced the claim that as the result of government assumption of control and distribution of foodstuffs, imports of this character necessarily pass into the charge of the state, and under such circumstances the British navy is justified in seizing all cargoes of German destination. Moreover, the contention is made that in the highly organized condition of Germany, where all the healthy males perform military service, imported foodstuffs would in fact be used by the military forces of the enemy. The weakness of this latter argument is apparent when it is recalled that the principle the United States and Great Britain have

advocated was pronounced with the knowledge that a nation at war necessarily must draw upon its population for soldiers. Unquestionably, however, a new element is introduced into the discussion by the action of the German government in assuming control of all foodstuffs imported.

The United States sought to avoid the difficulties which have arisen, by proposing to limit the consignment of foodstuffs to its own agencies in Germany, which should supervise the distribution and see that non-combatants only received them. Germany, of course, assented, but the British and French governments declined to consider the proposal, asserting they were moved to act as they were doing against Germany in consequence of the "unprecedented methods, repugnant to all law and morality, which Germany began to adopt at the very outset of the war, and the effects of which have been constantly accumulating."

Because cotton is an ingredient in the manufacture of high explosives, the British and French took steps to prevent it from

reaching Germany. At the outset of the war they were disposed to look upon it as innocent, and permitted American ships to convey the product to German ports. But as the war proceeded, they placed it upon the conditional contraband list, and now it is regarded as absolute contraband. The United States contends that raw cotton, because of the many innocent uses to which it may be put, should be regarded as conditional contraband. The British counter by calling attention to the conduct of the Union during the Civil War, when all cotton raised in the South was seized, to the great distress of British industry. However, this product was money to the South, for through it only could the Confederates pay for absolutely needed military supplies and as such it was contraband.

Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary, early began their campaign to prevent the exportation of munitions of war, in spite of the fact that there could be no question as to the propriety of the sale of such

products by individual citizens. President Wilson recognized it in his proclamation of neutrality issued at the outbreak of the war; and his recognition was sound in law and precedent. Munitions, by their very character, are absolute contraband and subject to seizure. Germany herself, to mention recent prior wars, sold such products to Russia, during the Russo-Japanese War; to Turkey, during the Turko-Italian War; to Great Britain, during the Boer War, to the Balkan States, during their wars, and even to General Huerta in Mexico, when that person was in control of the situation in Mexico City. In a memorandum to the State Department, the German Ambassador asserted that the situation in the existing war was different from that in any preceding war; that the United States was partial in that it was supplying only one side of the struggle, and that by its development of the arms industry, it had in fact created a new industry, all of which was in violation of the spirit of true neutrality. In his reply

President Wilson pointed out that any change in our laws of neutrality during the progress of a war, which would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war, would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality; and the placing of an embargo as had been suggested would constitute such a change and be a direct violation of American neutrality. Subsequently Austria-Hungary filed a protest against our traffic in arms with the Allies. It was answered by an admirable note denying the existence of any grounds in law for the Austro-Hungarian contention, and closing:

“The principles of international law, the practice of nations, the national safety of the United States and other nations without great military and naval establishments, the prevention of increased armies and navies, the adoption of peaceful methods for the adjustment of international differences, and finally, neu-

trality itself, are opposed to the prohibition by a neutral nation of the exportation of arms, ammunition and other munitions of war to belligerent powers during the progress of the war."

It is evident, of course, that in spite of the conclusive legal answers of the United States, the governments of the Central Powers resent our sale of arms to the Allies. When the writer was in Vienna and Berlin in December, 1914, he was told that had it not been for the action of American manufacturers in selling munitions to Great Britain, Russia and France, the war would have been ended two months before. Reports were circulated in the two empires that American bullets were killing German and Austrian soldiers; and General von Hindenburg was quoted as saying:

"How can I feel friendly toward a people with whom we have no quarrel and whose ammunition is daily killing my soldiers?"

It is interesting to remark in this connec-

tion that at the time the German papers were publishing letters denouncing our sale of munitions to the Allies, the quantity of such supplies crossing the seas was negligible. It was only during the latter part of 1915 that the exports began to assume anything like large figures; and from then on it was evident they would be in such proportions as to have an appreciable effect upon the war. The German maneuvers were inaugurated early in the war for the purpose of creating a feeling in the United States against the sale of munitions, and by this means it was hoped an embargo eventually would be imposed.

Germany has complained that if she violates or infringes international law, the United States instantly and sharply objects, whereas if the Allies commit outrages, this government limits itself to an innocuous protest or does nothing. The direct charge was made by the German Ambassador that President Wilson "acquiesces in the violations of international law by Great Britain." This charge is untrue. It was

given color, however, by the attention the Wilson administration gave to the submarine operations of Germany and the delay with which it handled trade questions with Great Britain. The policy Mr. Wilson adopted contemplated dealing with one thing at a time — the settlement first of the submarine controversy, and then the trade disputes. The difficulty of pursuing this "single-track" course lay in the fact that the questions intermingled, and that incidents multiplied with electric speed.

Germany has conceived and observed a policy toward the United States based upon the belief, first, that any action against her would lead to a civil war in this country; second, that we feared complications with her would seriously embarrass us in connection with the Mexican question; third, that we realized a war with a European power would cause Japan to spring upon our back; and fourth, that we were absolutely unprepared. Developments have certainly discredited the German view that there would be a civil war. In this

connection it may be said that evidence was placed before the American authorities alleging that the Germans have restricted the United States, made caches of arms and ammunition, and given instructions to reservists and others to report at designated headquarters whenever the necessity arose. The prospect that we will get ready for trouble also is having a considerable influence upon the attitude of the Central Powers. Moreover, it has been borne in upon the Berlin and Vienna authorities that it would be highly unwise to list the United States among their enemies. Without declaring war, we could impose an embargo on all supplies going to Germany; and thus stop the large quantities which pass through neutral territories. In itself, this would be a serious blow. Again, for the United States definitely to join the Allies would be to prevent the realization of the hope, always in the German breast, that we will become involved in a deadly quarrel with their enemies over trade questions.

War always produces resentments, especially against the innocent bystander. It is apparent Germany will not soon forgive us for the aid she considers we have given her enemies, and for our failure to compel them to live up to the principles of international law; that Austria-Hungary will not soon forgive us for dismissing Dr. Dumba, her Ambassador, and above all for our intimation in the note relative to the destruction of the Italian liner *Ancona* that we looked upon her as subservient to Germany; and that Turkey will not soon forgive us for the protests we made against the massacre of Armenians.

Moreover, the United States not only has furnished supplies to the Allies, but actually has financed them; and the Central Powers undoubtedly will remember this fact against us in the future. It is human for them to do so, for, given the same circumstances, the American people would take a like view against a foreign land. But looking at the matter from a perfectly cold-blooded point of view, it is apparent

the objections we have offered to Teutonic methods of warfare and to the action of the Central Powers in fighting the war within the United States, were in accordance with our duties as well as our rights of sovereignty. It is only to be regretted that our words have not been taken at their face value, and that we have been in the position of making threats which we had not the intention to carry out.

CHAPTER XII

AMERICA IN THE WORLD TO COME

Change and adjustments therewith are laws of nature. They go on in times of peace as an internal force in nations, and necessarily meet and harmonize or clash. Wars are the direct result of this constant movement. They strike the balance between peoples or within a people, make new relations or rather certify the relations which prior conditions produced, and establish a different plane whereon the process of adjustment continues.

Mark what has happened in the United States within the history of the present generation! Our thought, our needs, the government under which we live, have been sensibly influenced by the influx of immigrants. The increased control of disease has destroyed the old theory that a race to be healthy must live above the

frost line, and a movement has set in toward the south. Our diet has changed. Southern products are as important in our list of foods as northern products. Our commercial situation has changed. Industries once local have become national. There was a time when our wheat, corn, meat and cotton gave us a glow of self-sufficiency. To-day we need foreign products for our maintenance and to reduce the cost of living. Our exports were confined to raw materials; now one-fourth of them are manufactured articles. There have been modifications of our standards of social morality. The responsibilities once provincially limited to the family, the ward and the state, have crossed all political subdivisions and even passed far beyond our coastlines.

The foreign policies of the United States have been reflective of these changing conditions. A popular government is naturally sensitive to internal developments and consciously or unconsciously is controlled by them in its foreign conduct. It

is becoming more and more important to us that the countries with which we trade, particularly those within our sphere of influence, shall maintain peace and order, that they shall develop agriculturally, industrially and commercially, free from exploitation; that they shall respect property rights, including contracts, and that they shall treat us on precisely the same footing as their other customers. These material necessities go hand in hand with our interest in, our sentiment with reference to, their social development. In Mexico, for example, there must be established, first and foremost, industrial stability. To seek to impose upon that country, so long as it is independent, our form of government, our ideals of civilization, when its people are not prepared for anything of the kind, is to endeavor to build a monument from the capstone down.

As a matter of fact, disguise it to ourselves as we may, the United States is being driven inexorably to the point of exerting direct control over Mexico and the coun-

tries of Central America. In the establishment of this control, there will be a cost to pay in lives and money. To leave them as they are is to shirk our moral responsibilities; to refuse to lift them from their social degradation is to suffer commercial loss and to leave untapped the wealth which could be utilized for the benefit of mankind. To establish control is to pay the price; but the American people have never refused to honor their bills when justly incurred.

Of course, the United States has no divine mission to right the wrongs of the world; but it has a direct interest in evils elsewhere, for those evils react upon its own happiness, its own welfare and its own prosperity. Therefore, it is manifestly concerned in the preservation and extension of human liberty, the existence and promotion of human welfare; and it is justified in acting whenever and wherever broad, humanitarian principles are at stake.

It is imperative, especially at a time when the east and the west are aflame, that

the United States should take stock of its necessities, its duties and its obligations, and determine whither they are leading it. It is imperative for it to study and to know the conditions which the clash of arms is developing, and to be prepared against the time when negotiations shall write the settlement the war will force. Great world issues will be involved in that settlement; and in its terms the United States will have a direct interest. We could not escape the effects if we would. In spite of our non-participation in the war, it is important for us to figure in the negotiations of peace, preferably as mediator. That we can play such a role is exceedingly doubtful; for, as a result of our diplomacy, the Central Powers will not be disposed to confide their interests to our charge in the preliminaries leading to a direct exchange of views with their enemies. A like unwillingness is developing among the Allies.

If we do not serve as mediator, we must, through other channels, acquire accurate information as to the proposals discussed.

Some of them will touch the welfare and development of the United States, and call for our protest and even resistance. Should there be a Peace Congress, China will desire admission in order to appeal for a world guarantee of her integrity. Japan will oppose her admission, and in this attitude is likely to have the support of Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy — should those countries cling together — in view of their general agreement to determine in common before the negotiations the terms they will lay down. The United States will have to decide whether it is advisable, whether it can afford, to back China and antagonize Japan and the powers behind her. Vast areas of territory will change hands. In the project of the Allies to restore Belgium to the Belgian people, the majority of Americans have a sentimental interest; all of us have a vital interest in the fate of the islands wrested from Germany in the Pacific. Our Americans of Polish and Jewish birth will desire the support of

the Washington government in the movement to re-establish the independent Kingdom of Poland and to obtain equality for the Jews in Europe.

It is impossible, of course, for the Allies to annihilate the German people, just as it is impossible for the Central Powers to annihilate the British, the French, or the Russian people. Yet there is certain to be a remaking of the map of Europe. The way it will be done appears of remote concern to us; nevertheless, it will determine the question whether the peace arranged shall be temporary or comparatively permanent, and it will compress or expand economic forces which will influence our future.

The bitterness the war has engendered will exclude Allied goods from German markets and German goods from Allied markets for years to come. In anticipation of this situation, the Allies already are providing favorable exchange conditions as between themselves and their possessions, and the British government and

British merchants are devising plans to hold the trade left by the war, and to develop and extend it. When the war shall end, Germany's warriors will return to shops and factories, and the formidable industrial and commercial organization of that country, perfected to greater efficiency and speeded with greater energy by necessity, will devote itself anew to the peaceful conquest of world markets. The rapidity of the flow of a stream is determined by the width of its banks; and the tremendous volume of output of Europe will drive with terrific force upon the United States and the markets in which we trade. To meet this danger, if we ourselves succeed in remaining at peace, there must be a more intensive industrial, commercial and financial organization in the United States; close co-operation in foreign selling; establishment of "free ports," similar to Hamburg and Copenhagen; a scientific readjustment of our tariff rates in accordance with the views of a nonpartisan commission, and a revision of all our commer-

cial treaties; an increase in our merchant marine and the relief of our shippers from the disadvantage of exorbitant charges and rebates; and the wise exercise by our bankers of the power of financing our trade and extending foreign credits.

It is apparent there presses upon the American people the need of a permanent and continuous foreign policy, not rigid but fluid, a policy that will realize our moral, our political and our commercial aspirations. It, of course, should be non-partisan, lifted above the plane of domestic politics, and in no sense the football of party expediency or the whim of different administrations. It should be essentially national; laws should be passed empowering the federal government to intervene in judicial processes involving foreigners and foreign interests in the several states. It should place national honor above national welfare; for to tarnish the former is to place a stain forever upon the flag. It should be careful of national

prestige. A country is judged in the light of its past conduct and is treated by foreign governments accordingly. It should maintain the faith, for scrupulous fidelity in the discharge of obligations is as important to a nation as reputation is to a man. Therefore, the greatest care should be made in the negotiations of treaties, to bind ourselves only to those things which we intend to and can observe. Germany to-day is suffering from the shame of violating the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium.

Our policy in the Western Hemisphere must be based upon the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, upon our vital interests in the Caribbean Sea and upon friendly relations with Latin America; and generally upon our vital interests in the Pacific and upon the principle of equal opportunity throughout the world. It is to our interest to encourage the creation of arbitral tribunals, but we should be careful not to agree to the reference in advance to such tribunals of

any question which might result in popular repudiation of the award made; and in this possibility lies the grave objection to the all-inclusive arbitration treaties negotiated by the Taft Administration and the all-inclusive investigation treaties signed by Mr. Bryan and ratified in the early days of the war, when "safety first" was the base refuge of the representatives of the people.

How can a permanent and continuous foreign policy be created in the United States? There is nothing easier. Through our wonderful press, conducted by the brainiest minds in the country, and through other mediums, it is not difficult for the government to ascertain the sentiment of the people upon any important issue. It is necessary only that this sentiment shall be grounded upon facts and influenced by a knowledge of conditions abroad. Before the war our interest in foreign affairs was impersonal, casual. Since the war began it has become personal, vital. There thus exists an oppor-

tunity to inaugurate a scheme of education, based on broad lines of statesmanship and modern diplomacy.

In the conduct of a permanent and continuous foreign policy, it is essential that we have statesmen, not politicians, at the head of our State Department. Solely because Mr. Bryan aided him to get the Democratic nomination, and because of the political power and prestige he enjoyed, President Wilson named him as Secretary of State. For more than two years the United States suffered from amateur diplomacy, from an effort to apply domestic political methods to international affairs. There must be maintained a permanent force in the State Department, secure, well-paid, equipped to apply to developments the pre-determined policies required by the nation's needs. There should be maintained also permanent diplomatic and consular services, as contemplated by the measures inaugurated by President Roosevelt.

The consular service is well established

since the people, early in the Wilson Administration, indicated they would not look with favor upon the displacement of tried men by political workers. As our diplomats we must have men of the world, aware of our needs and purposes, students of international law and history, familiar with the complicated relations between nations, including their alliances and friendships and the reasons therefor, and acquainted with the natural and inevitable tendencies of peoples and their laws and customs and policies with regard to finance and trade. It is to create dangers for ourselves to reward politicians by appointment to diplomatic office; for agents abroad must be able not only to report an event and its significance, but to advise as to the attitude their government should adopt.

It is a sign of weakness, save in special emergencies, to send special commissioners abroad. Such action is accepted as a reflection upon the capacity of the man duly and regularly appointed, and affects

his influence with the government to which he is accredited. Mr. Wilson pursued this unfortunate policy, sending agents in bewildering succession to Mexico, and from time to time he has dispatched to Europe a personal friend, who had had no experience whatever in the intricate web of war diplomacy. All these commissioners have ability; but, as indicated, their appearance was harmful to the diplomats on the ground. Moreover, Congress, and particularly the Senate, is placed in the position of having to act upon measures advocated by the President at the instance of a personal agent whose character and capacity it does not know, whereas in the selection of diplomatic representatives, it has had an opportunity to ascertain their qualifications.

President Wilson truthfully described our perilous situation when he said, in advocating preparedness, a year and a half after the war had begun, that the developments of a day or even an hour might plunge us into conflict. It is unfortunate

for the country that an effective program of defense was not immediately advocated and adopted at the outbreak of the struggle. A year and a half of precious time was lost, and it will require fully that period to create an effective army and to make even a real start in providing an adequate navy.

It is obvious that if foreign nations consider us able to resist, they will be disposed to respect our rights and pay attention to our wishes. It is equally obvious that as the war continues, friction with all the belligerents will increase. We face the grave danger of being drawn into the maelstrom while it is swirling; we face the even graver danger of war when peace shall be restored abroad. It will be no news to the American people to tell them that we are to-day without a real friend in the world. Our diplomacy, the utterances of our statesmen in office, have not been calculated to win the support of any nation, save, perhaps, those

of South America; and the Latin-Americans remain suspicious of our purposes. Not that the United States should have alliances — the advice of Washington is as good to-day as when given. But friendly neutrality is a valuable asset in time of war, and worth the efforts to assure it.

Will not the debt-ridden belligerents, when they have returned to peace as between themselves, look with envy upon our riches gained from their needs?

President Wilson has proclaimed the view that we should have the greatest navy in the world. Is it likely that England, without resistance, will abdicate the position of mistress of the seas? Would it not have been far better from the standpoint of national interest quietly to have pursued the policy of up-building the fleet until it attained a size both in personnel and materiel and an expertness of administration and operation, which would assure the protection of our home terri-

tory, the protection of our foreign possessions, and the protection of our foreign commerce and interests?

Pacifists assert that the belligerents will be so exhausted by the end of the war that they will be unable to embark upon a new struggle. History points to the contrary, except in the case of the defeated which has been saddled with a huge indemnity. When the Civil War terminated, the Union, which had expended in all about forty per cent of its national wealth (Great Britain is spending six per cent annually), threatened European powers because they had endeavored to control Mexico while the United States was in the throes of revolution. Rather than battle with our magnificent fleet and magnificent veteran armies, those powers withdrew from Mexican soil. Here then is evidence upon which to base the statement that the belligerents in the present war, especially those who gain the victory, will not be so exhausted that they can not move against the United States, if they

will. It follows that if the United States desires to save itself from war or to protect its territory and interests, it must develop a sufficient fleet before the European struggle shall end. That fleet must be supported, not by a makeshift, untrained force, but by a regular, efficient and adequate mobile army, backed by a trained citizenry. Under such conditions, the navy will be free to observe the primal principle of strategy—find the enemy upon the seas and destroy him.

This is no policy of militarism; it is a policy of common sense. The people of the United States are not moved by any spirit of aggrandizement. The only victories they want are the victories of peace. They have no desire for conquest, save the conquest of themselves; no desire for sovereignty save the sovereignty over themselves. They respect the independence and sovereignty of the weakest nations precisely as they respect the independence and sovereignty of the strongest nations. They stand for equality, for righteousness, no less in the

things of the spirit than in the things of the flesh. They wish to be prosperous themselves, to maintain law and order within their own territories, and to exercise their right of freely carrying out their own destinies with due regard to the destinies of others. Because they realize there can be no permanent prosperity and no permanent happiness in one section of the world unless there be permanent prosperity and permanent happiness everywhere, they are inspired by ideals which are based upon the doctrines of common justice and common good.

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
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